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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background
Various plans developed by the Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) have indicated for
some time a need for expansion of the Alberta electrical transmission system. This was also
recommended in Alberta’s Provincial Energy Strategy released in December of 2008 and it
seems generally accepted that some expansion is appropriate.  However, there are many
complex issues involved in determining the exact nature and extent of this expansion.  These
issues have traditionally been sorted out through the work of the AESO, followed by a formal
application and open hearings by the regulator, the Alberta Utilities Commission  (AUC).
In June of 2009 the Alberta government proposed new amendments (Bill 50) to the Electric
Utilities Act, the Hydro and Electric Energy Act, and the Alberta Utilities Commission Act that
significantly alter the regulatory process for the approval of new high-voltage transmission
lines. Bill 50 introduces the concept of Critical Transmission Infrastructure (CTI), defined as
transmission and related facilities determined by the government to be in the public interest.
Under this Bill, CTI is subject to substantially reduced regulatory oversight by the Alberta
Utilities Commission (AUC).  It suspends the regulatory framework established under the
Electric Utilities Act requiring the Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) to demonstrate a
“need” for the facilities and a finding by the AUC that the facilities are in the public interest.  
Bill 50 also identifies the following four transmission projects as critical infrastructure:
• Two High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission facilities in the Edmonton-Calgary
corridor, each with a minimum capacity of 2,000 megawatts (MW).
• A double circuit 500 kV alternating current line between Edmonton and the Gibbons-
Redwater region.
• A new 240 kV substation in southeast Calgary.
• Two single-circuit 500 kV alternating current lines between Edmonton and Fort McMurray.
The estimated cost for these four projects is approximately $5.7 billion. The cost for the two
HVDC lines in the Edmonton-Calgary corridor is more than $3.1 billion. The four projects in
Bill 50 are a subset of the $14.5 billion for transmission projects identified in the Long-term
Transmission System Plan filed by the AESO in June of 2009. 
Objectives
The objectives in this study are to provide:
• a review  of the institutional framework instituted by the government’s transmission policy. 
• a test of the efficiency implications of the government’s transmission policy based on a
comparison of the costs and benefits of the two large-capacity HVDC lines proposed for the
Edmonton-Calgary corridor relative to alternatives.
• a brief evaluation of the proposed regulatory process under Bill 50. 
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3Summary of Conclusions
• The absence of strong locational price signals within the current transmission pricing
approach creates the potential for excessive demand for expansion of transmission facilities
and potential for discrimination against generation located near load or demand. This, in
turn, can result in distortions in the market for electricity and in higher costs of delivered
electricity to consumers.
• In the absence of strong locational price signals, the regulatory process is critical in terms
of providing a check against excessive or inefficient overbuilding of transmission facilities.
Inefficiency arises when the costs exceed the benefits of incremental facilities.
Based on an efficiency assessment of the two, large-capacity HVDC lines proposed for the
Edmonton-Calgary corridor, there is concern that, under Bill 50, there is inadequate
attention to the costs of inefficient overbuilding and the consequence of higher than
necessary electricity costs for Alberta consumers.  Of particular concern is the fact that
under Bill 50 there are no opportunities for a transparent, independent and arm’s-length
review of the benefits and costs of projects deemed critical infrastructure.
• The analysis presented compares the costs of resolving the anticipated north-south
transmission congestion with the two high-voltage direct current power lines versus the
costs of a generation-only solution.  It is not argued that a generation-only solution is
optimal. Rather, a mix of generation and transmission expansion will likely be most
efficient. 
• Various cases are considered to take into account such things as different rates of growth of
wind power and treatment of greenhouse gas emissions.  Under all cases any increased
costs of generation were found to be significantly lower than the cost of building the two
HVDC lines. The additional cost associated with the two HVDC lines ranged from
$1.1 billion to $2.2 billion above that for the generation-only case, while maintaining
supply adequacy and continuing to meet reliability requirements.  The lowest additional
cost estimate assumes no additional wind generation and that greenhouse gas offset costs
are zero.  The largest estimates assume that the two HVDC lines do not reduce line losses.
Our estimates for the additional cost associated with the two HVDC lines under the most
probable conditions range from $1.7 billion to $1.9 billion.
• There are advantages and disadvantages to using an independent regulator to assess whether
a transmission project is in the public interest. The former, at least in theory, include the
greater likelihood that the long-term perspective will dominate short-term political interests
and a regulator likely has a greater ability to draw on expertise, process, and public
participation to evaluate and adjudicate complex issues. The process also requires the
regulator, through written decisions, to provide and document the rationale for each
decision. The disadvantages include the fact that regulatory hearings are often costly and
decisions may not be timely.  In this context it may well be that Bill 50 is a response to
certain frustrations and costs associated with obtaining regulatory approval for some
projects.  However, unilateral government action in such cases may only provide a superior
solution if there is widespread agreement on the problem, time is of the essence and the
cost of not addressing the problem is far more expensive than exploring alternatives. Our
results, showing that the two large HVDC lines that are proposed are economically
inefficient and unwarranted given the AESO’s assumptions and forecasts, point to the
4benefit of a regulatory process, and raise doubts that the state of reliability and supply
adequacy indicate the need for an emergency response. If the existing regulatory process is
found to be dysfunctional (and there appears to be frustration on the part of generators at
the pace of transmission expansion), the answer may be that it is better to institute
regulatory reform than abandon regulation. The uproar over Bill 50 and the two HVDC
lines may also highlight the value of a regulatory process. Having the debate over highly
complex transmission investment issues carried on in the media through duelling public
relations campaigns and websites is not likely to serve the public interest. 
Qualifications
Given the importance of electricity to the welfare of Albertans, and the heightened political
sensitivities to transmission policy, it is important to emphasize what this paper does not do
and what we do not conclude.
• This study is not a critique of the existing market design and institutions in Alberta, but
rather is focused on concerns with transmission policy and Bill 50. We illustrate that those
concerns might well be material by considering the economics of the two HVDC lines in
the Edmonton-Calgary corridor. We have not undertaken an analysis of the three other CTI
projects in Bill 50.
• This study does not conclude that the Alberta experience with regulatory restructuring and
the introduction of competition and market forces into the Alberta Interconnected Electric
System (AIES) is a failure. 
• This study does not propose specific pricing policies for transmission in Alberta. Nor does
it provide suggestions for the planning process and the approval of investment in
transmission in Alberta. These are important issues. Given the time and resources available
they could not be properly addressed in this paper.
• We do not conclude that any north-south reinforcement of the transmission grid is
inefficient or not required. We do not conclude that a generation-only solution is optimal. A
mix of generation and transmission expansion may be optimal.  
• Our conclusion is that the large cost and capacity of the two HVDC lines, 4,000 megawatts,
is an overbuild that is not warranted by its economics. There may be other benefits that we
have not considered that justify the two HVDC lines. However, for these considerations to
overturn our conclusion that the two HVDC lines are inefficient, it is necessary to establish
that the benefits not counted in our analysis are worth more than $1.7 billion to $1.9 billion,
and that those benefits cannot be achieved by a less expensive alternative. Prebuilding
transmission in advance to increase investment in generation, strengthening the system to
increase intertie capacity, the mitigation of market power, and minimization of land impact
and rights of way are examples of the benefits that have been suggested. 
• An additional benefit of the two HVDC lines that has been suggested is that they are
necessary to meet reliability requirements. However, reliability requirements can be met in
a variety of ways. The generation-only alternative considered in this study is one alternative
that continues to meet reliability requirements.   
5• A particular concern is that the development of congestion and/or a more efficient
congestion policy in the AIES would require a costly redesign of the market. While this
may or may not be true, it is not sufficient to merely assert that any redesign instituted
because of congestion or implementation of a different congestion policy would be more
costly than substantially overbuilding transmission facilities. Instead it is necessary to show
that the costs from redesign would exceed the extra costs associated with the congestion-
free policy. Our results show that the costs of a congestion-free policy, in terms of the costs
of delivered electricity, can be substantial.
61.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In June of 2009 the Alberta government proposed new amendments to the Electric Utilities
Act, the Hydro and Electric Energy Act, and the Alberta Utilities Commission Act. The
amendments, known as Bill 50,1 significantly alter the regulatory process for the approval of
new high-voltage transmission lines in Alberta. Bill 50 introduces the concept of Critical
Transmission Infrastructure (CTI), transmission facilities determined by the government to be
in the public interest. Under Bill 50, CTI is subject to substantially reduced regulatory
oversight by the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC). The AUC’s jurisdiction will be limited
to issues arising from the siting of the facilities. For power lines deemed critical, Bill 50
suspends the regulatory framework established under the Electric Utilities Act requiring the
Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO), the organization that plans the province’s
transmission grid, to demonstrate a “need” for the facilities Bill 50 also suspends the
requirement for the regulator to find that the facilities are in the public interest.2
In addition to changing the regulatory process for CTI, Bill 50 also identifies four transmission
projects as critical infrastructure. These are: 3
(i) Two High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission facilities in the Edmonton-
Calgary corridor, each with a minimum capacity of 2,000 megawatts.
(ii) A double circuit 500 kV alternating current line between Edmonton and the Gibbons-
Redwater region.
(iii) A new 240 kV substation in southeast Calgary.
(iv) Two single-circuit 500 kV alternating current lines between Edmonton and Fort
McMurray.
The estimated cost for these four projects is approximately $5.7 billion.4 The cost for the two
HVDC lines in the Edmonton-Calgary corridor is more than $3.1 billion.5 The four projects in
Bill 50 are a subset of the $14.5 billion for transmission projects identified in the Long-term
Transmission System Plan filed by the AESO in June of 2009.6
1 http://www.assembly.ab.ca/ISYS/LADDAR_files/docs/bills/bill/legislature_27/session_2/20090210_bill-050.pdf.
2 The AESO was established by Section 7 of the Electric Utilities Act. Under the Electric Utilities Act the AESO is
responsible for the operation of the Alberta Interconnected Electric System, including the terms of access for
generators to connect to the transmission grid and arranging for the expansion and enhancement of the transmission
grid  (Section 15).  The transmission grid is privately owned.
3 Bill 50 2(13).
4 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan at p. 56, June 2009. See also talk about Bill 50, Alberta Department of
Energy, September 2009. The government includes the recently approved southern system reinforcement project as
CTI. However, it is not one of the projects identified as CTI in Bill 50 and was approved under the existing
regulatory requirements. See Alberta Utilities Commission, Alberta Electric System Operator, Needs Identification
Document Application, Southern Alberta Transmission System Reinforcement, Decision 2009-126, September 8,
2009. Adding the cost of the southern reinforcement project ($2.5 billion) to the $5.7 billion of the four CTI projects
gives approximately $8.1 billion which is the figure sometimes quoted as the cost of the Bill 50 projects.
5 Powering Albertans, AESO p. 12.
6 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept 23, 2009.
Bill 50 is consistent with Alberta’s Provincial Energy Strategy emphasis on the urgent need to
strengthen Alberta’s transmission grid.7 The motivation for Bill 50 and the four projects
deemed CTI follow from a perception that “The need for major new transmission is critical.”8
There has been limited expansion of any significance to the transmission grid in Alberta since
the 1980s which, coupled with significant increases in load and generation growth,9 has raised
concerns about congestion and system reliability.10 The concern is that the reliability of the
transmission grid will be impaired as it operates near its limits, and that the grid will not be
able to support the requirements of large load centres, especially Calgary, thereby undermining
supply adequacy. There is also a desire to improve transmission efficiency and reduce line
losses.11 Line losses were $236 million in 2008 and are forecast to be $126 million in 2009.12
The government’s motivation is not, however, limited to a concern about keeping the lights on.
The government’s transmission policy makes explicit its view that an unconstrained
transmission grid—a transmission network that does not limit the supply from any generator—
is a key element of its goal to establish and promote a competitive generation sector.13
A cornerstone of the government’s transmission policy is “that transmission is a public good
that must be available in advance of need”14 and failure to provide adequate transmission
capacity will reduce development of new supply. Unconstrained and available transmission
capacity ensures that generators are not deterred from making investments in capacity by
concerns that they will be constrained from selling power due to limits on their access to the
transmission grid. An unconstrained transmission grid also means that the province is one
integrated market for electricity, with a common price established by bidding in the power
pool. The existence of constraints on the transmission grid could create regional markets.
This paper has three objectives.  They are to provide:
(i) a review and analysis of the institutional framework instituted by the government’s
transmission policy. That policy, first articulated in the Alberta Department of Energy’s
7 See Department of Energy, Launching Alberta’s Energy Future: Provincial Energy Strategy, at
http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/Initiatives/strategy.asp.
8 talk about Alberta’s Electricity Transmission System, Department of Energy, July 2009.
9 Load refers to “an end-use device or a customer that receives power from the electric system.  Often load is used as
synonymous with demand”.  S. Stoft, Power System Economics, Piscataway, New Jersey:  IEEE Press, at p. 448.
10 There has been some expansion and addition of new lines. For instance, ATCO Electric’s Dover to Whitefish line
went into service in 2004. This line is 350 km long and cost just under $100 million. See ATCO Electric Press
Release, ATCO Electric First Canadian Company to Take Home International Edison Award, June 21, 2005.
11 Line losses are energy losses due to heat from resistance to electrical current flow on the transmission lines.
12 AESO Transmission — Loss Factors — Calibration Factors -2009 http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/2009_Rider-E-
Report_Layout_Q4_2009_SEP_24_2009.pdf, Accessed October 22, 2009.
13 http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/Electricity/pdfs/transmissionPolicy.pdf.
14 talk about Alberta’s Electricity Transmission System, DOE, July 2009. The government’s definition of a public good
differs from that generally accepted in economics.  In economics a public good is defined by two characteristics:
non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability.  Non-rivalry in consumption means that consumption by one does
not reduce the benefits from consumption by another. Non-excludability means that it is difficult or very expensive to
stop someone from consuming the good.  Transmission is both excludable and subject to congestion meaning it is not
a public good as conventionally defined.
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policy paper, Transmission Development: the Right Path for Alberta,15 and formalized in
the Transmission Regulation 16 governs transmission pricing, planning and investment in
the Alberta Interconnected Electric System (AIES). 
(ii) a quantitative assessment of the efficiency of Alberta’s transmission policy by comparing
the costs and benefits of the two large-capacity HVDC lines proposed for the Edmonton-
Calgary corridor, deemed critical under Bill 50, to an alternative generation-only
solution.  
(iii) an evaluation of the proposed regulatory process under Bill 50. The interesting question
Bill 50 raises with respect to process is the nature of the costs and benefits of the existing
regulatory approval process and whether they warrant, in the case of transmission,
suspension of a public regulatory process.
1.1 Summary of Conclusions
Our conclusions related to these objectives are summarized below.
(i) Our review and analysis focused on the effective price of transmission for generators and
its effect on generation location and demand for transmission. This analysis suggests the
potential for excessive demand for expansion of transmission facilities and the potential
for a system that discriminates against generation located near to load or demand, raising
the cost to consumers of delivered electricity. The present pricing of transmission creates
incentives that are likely to encourage an inefficient mix of transmission and generation
assets and, to the extent that happens, raise the total costs of the AIES. In our view, Bill
50 is consistent with existing transmission policy and arises from the perception that the
existing regulatory process is dysfunctional and incapable of implementing that policy.
Given the transmission policy adopted by the government, it is important to have
regulatory oversight to constrain the degree of inefficient overbuilding of the
transmission grid. This inefficient overbuilding arises when the costs of incremental
transmission facilities exceed their benefits.  Our economic analysis of the two HVDC
lines proposed under Bill 50 for the Edmonton-Calgary corridor shows that the extent of
this inefficiency can be substantial.
(ii) We find the proposal to build the two HVDC lines in the Edmonton-Calgary path is an
inefficient response to concerns over adequate supply and reliability. We illustrate this by
comparing the cost of resolving the anticipated north-south transmission congestion with
the two high-voltage power lines versus the costs of a generation-only solution.  We do
not argue that a generation-only solution is optimal. Indeed a mix of generation and
transmission expansion may be optimal. Presumably the extent to which the two HVDC
lines impose higher costs is even greater relative to the optimal mix of generation and
transmission expansion.
15 http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/Electricity/pdfs/transmissionPolicy.pdf.
16 http://www.qp.alberta.ca/570.cfm?search_by=alpha&letter=T.
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9Under all scenarios considered, the increased costs of generation in the generation-only
solution, from re-dispatch and higher cost incremental expansion in the south (in some
cases) to avoid violating the transfer limits on the existing north-south transmission path,
were found to be significantly lower than the cost of building the two HVDC lines.
The additional cost associated with the two HVDC lines ranged from $1.1 billion to
$2.2 billion above that for the generation-only case while maintaining supply adequacy
and continuing to meet reliability requirements.  This increase in cost is the additional
real resource cost associated with the provision of electricity to Albertans. The lowest
additional cost estimate assumes no additional wind generation and that greenhouse gas
offset costs are zero.  The largest estimates assume that the two HVDC lines do not
reduce line losses. Our preferred estimates for the additional cost associated with the two
HVDC lines range from $1.7 billion to $1.9 billion.
Our study evaluates the cost of re-dispatching existing generation and/or locating new
combined cycle gas-fired generators in southern Alberta as an alternative to the proposed
HVDC transmission reinforcements between Edmonton and southern Alberta. We
compare the relative costs of the two alternatives to determine which is the least costly:
generation with lower-cost generation in the north plus transmission expansion (two
HVDC lines), versus generation with higher incremental cost in the south. We do this by
assuming that if the two HVDC lines are built, dispatch will be unconstrained. If the two
HVDC lines are not built, then dispatch of generation in the north might be constrained
by limits on the north-south transmission line. This will increase costs if lower-cost
generation in the north is displaced by higher-cost generation in the south and if limiting
flows on the north-south transmission path to current limits requires expansion of higher-
cost capacity in the south instead of lower-cost capacity in the north. We compare the
difference in the cost of generation between the HVDC and no HVDC case to determine
the advantage of adding the two HVDC lines. If this advantage is less than the cost of
installing the two HVDC lines, then the generation-only solution is least costly. Over the
period 2008 to 2028, the net present value (NPV) of the annual costs of the planned
HVDC transmission reinforcements are estimated to be $2.25 billion.17
We expect that the re-dispatch of generators because of a transmission constraint will
raise the fuel costs of generation as it involves substituting southern generation with
higher fuel cost for northern generation with lower fuel cost.  However, if generation
expansion in the south is required, the effect of the transmission constraint will also
depend on the relative magnitude of the long-run unit costs of any additional generation.
We have assumed that incremental generation added in the north is supercritical
pulverized coal generation and incremental generation added in the south is combined
cycle gas generation. In this case, the effect of a north-south transmission constraint is to
substitute incremental combined cycle gas generation in the south for incremental
supercritical pulverized coal generation in the north. If the long-run unit cost of
supercritical pulverized coal generation is less than the long-run unit cost of combined
cycle gas generation, then the transmission constraint, to the extent that it changes the
pattern of incremental expansion, results in an increase in generation costs. 
17 All net present value numbers reported in this study, unless otherwise indicated, are discounted back to 2008 and are
in real 2008 dollars.
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We find that the benefits of the two high-voltage power lines in avoiding costs of
generation re-dispatch and/or adding combined cycle gas generation in the south are
limited by the development of significant wind capacity in southern Alberta. If wind
capacity is installed as projected by the AESO in its long-term plan, then the incremental
generation required to meet load in Alberta can be only coal-fired generation located in
the Edmonton area even if the two HVDC lines are not built.18 The ENMAX Crossfield
plant is expected to be operational in 2010, providing 120 MW to southern Alberta.
Beyond this, no additional generation capacity in the south is required to re-dispatch
generation such that north-south transfers remain within current limits. If the maintained
assumption is that wind generation will be available as projected by the AESO, the only
additional cost associated with not proceeding with the two high-voltage lines is the
incremental variable cost differential caused by re-dispatch.  There is no change to the
pattern of incremental generation expansion if the two HDVC lines are not built if wind
capacity develops as expected.
If we assume that wind power develops as forecast, then the net present value (NPV) of
the cost of re-dispatching generators to maintain north-south transfers within estimated
2008 limits is expected to be $228 million. This assumes generation dispatch will follow
current patterns (observed generation dispatch). If all existing and forecast generation
capacity is assumed to dispatch at its variable cost (variable cost dispatch), the NPV of
the costs could be as low as $21 million. 
We also explore the sensitivity of our results to the costs of greenhouse gas emissions,
the price of natural gas, line losses, and development of wind power.
If we assume the costs of greenhouse gas emissions are zero, then the variable cost
advantage of coal generation over combined cycle gas generation becomes larger and the
NPVs of the cost of re-dispatch rise to $245 million (observed generation dispatch) or
$23 million (variable cost dispatch). We find that, for the costs of re-dispatch to equal the
costs of the two HVDC lines, the price of gas (in real $2008) would have to rise to
$66.80/GJ (observed generation dispatch) or $790.70/GJ (variable cost dispatch). Both of
these are dramatic increases over the price used by the AESO in determining long-run
expected costs: approximately $7.50/GJ. 
The average line losses per year over 2008 and 2009 for the power grid are
approximately $180 million. The proposed north-south reinforcement can reduce but not
eliminate these losses. If north-south reinforcement eliminated 25 per cent of these
losses, then an additional cost of not introducing the two HVDC lines (and no other
reinforcement alternative) from continued lines losses would have a NPV of $292 million
($2008). If the two HVDC lines eliminated 25 per cent of system line losses, then the
NPV of the cost of the generation-only case is between $1.73 billion and $1.94 billion
less than the cost of the two high-voltage lines. 
18 This forecast does not include the impact of the Montana Alberta Tieline which will enable wind-energy producers in
Montana to sell their output into Alberta. The expected in service date of this line is early 2011. This is an
incremental source of energy into southern Alberta that would act to alleviate north to south loading on the
Edmonton to Calgary transmission path.
Given the AESO’s assumptions regarding long-run unit costs inclusive of greenhouse gas
costs, the long-run average cost of supercritical pulverized coal generation is greater than
the long-run average cost (inclusive of greenhouse gas emission costs) of combined cycle
gas generation at any capacity factor. The variable cost advantage of coal is no longer
large enough to make up for its fixed cost disadvantage (from high capital costs) even at
high capacity factors. If coal-fired generation is more expensive than combined cycle
gas-fired generation, then the assumed trade-off with respect to incremental generation—
high cost in the south versus low cost in the north—does not exist. 
Based on the AESO’s forecasts of costs, coal capacity in the north is unlikely to be
installed even if the two HVDC lines are built. If the coal generation is not built because
it is not economic (as suggested by the AESO’s assumptions), then there is likely little or
no advantage and only a cost to building the two HVDC lines. Instead, incremental
combined cycle gas generation should be located closer to load in the south. 
We also explore the sensitivity of our results to the assumption that wind capacity in
southern Alberta will develop as expected by the AESO. The assumption in the planning
scenarios (made by the AESO and us) is to de-rate wind based on its average availability.
For instance, the estimated 6,000 MW of wind expected by 2028 produces an average of
2,120 MW of output.19 The problem is that this average will not be representative of the
variation in energy production in any given hour. To the extent that wind generation from
various facilities is positively correlated, the average could be misleading. If the
correlation is one, then situations can arise where either all of the wind is available or
none of it is available. The AESO in their long-term plan assume that wind is “firmed”
after 2018.20 Firming means that the average de-rated capacity will always be available.
The alternatives for firming include investment in additional capacity equal to the de-
rated expected capacity. If the HVDC transmission lines are not built this would be gas-
fired generation in the south. If the HVDC transmission lines proceed this could be coal
and/or gas in the north and gas in the south.  There are other alternatives to achieve
firming of the wind capacity, including storage or expanding the capabilities of the tie
line with British Columbia.
Given the AESO’s assumptions regarding greenhouse gas offset costs, gas fired
generation in the south has lower long-run unit costs and does not require investment in
transmission. Hence gas-fired generation in the south is preferred. Even if greenhouse
gas offset costs are reduced by 40 per cent this conclusion still holds.
19 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix G, June 2009. The AESO assumes a range of capacity
availability for wind, from 27.5 per cent to 37.5 per cent, with an average value of 32.5 per cent. Based on historical
wind dispatch, we assume instead a 35 per cent capacity availability. 
20 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix G, June 2009 at p. 284: With respect to wind, “It was
assumed that an economic energy storage technology would be available to projects built in 2018 and after.”
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But if greenhouse gas offset costs fall by more than 40 per cent then the long-run unit costs
of coal can be lower than gas-fired generation at sufficiently high capacity factors. For
instance if greenhouse gas offset costs are zero, then coal-fired generation has a lower long-
run unit cost than combined-cycle gas if the capacity factor is greater than 60 per cent. For
greenhouse gas offset costs less than 60 per cent of the AESO’s assumed value it may be
possible that expanding coal generation in the north and adding transmission capacity would
be less expensive to firm up wind than combined-cycle gas in the south. However, we find
that this is not the case.
Using coal-fired generation to firm up wind capacity is not likely to be optimal because
coal-fired generation is typically baseloaded.21 It would be more natural to assume that
the choice is between gas-fired capacity in the south and gas-fired capacity in the north
plus transmission. In that case, the best choice is gas-fired generation in the south since
the generation cost is the same and an expansion of transmission capacity is not required.
Another interpretation that makes coal-fired generation in the north a more logical
alternative is if wind power is simply not developed. This is an extreme assumption that
favours the development of coal in the north and adding transmission capacity.
We consider whether  our conclusion regarding the economic efficiency of the proposed
HVDC lines is robust to zero greenhouse gas offset costs and no additional wind
investment after 2009, assuming variable cost based dispatch. In the unconstrained case,
(with the proposed HVDC lines) we assume that coal and gas-fired capacity is added in
the north, where we limit the amount of incremental coal generation added so that it
operates at a capacity factor of 85 per cent or more.22 In the constrained case, (without
the proposed HVDC  lines) incremental generation in the north is also assumed to be a
mix of coal and gas, where we again restrict the capacity factor for the coal plants to be
greater than 85 per cent, and is only gas-fired generation in the south. Under these
assumptions we find that the NPV of the lower generation costs in the unconstrained case
is $815 million ($2008) instead of $21 million ($2008). Though this is a large increase in
the benefit associated with the two HVDC lines, the NPV of the two HVDC lines is still
$1.1 billion more than the generation-only solution.  It also assumes greenhouse gas
offset costs are zero.
(iii) There are advantages to using an independent regulator to assess whether a transmission
project is in the public interest. It is less likely that project approval and conditions will
be driven by short-term political interests and more likely that the regulator’s perspective
will reflect long-term benefits and costs to the province. Regulatory agencies typically
draw on relevant expertise, historical awareness and background knowledge to
understand, evaluate and adjudicate complex issues. A public process allows for greater 
21 Baseload generation is normally operated all day to meet baseload demand, the part of load that is relatively
constant.  Coal-fired generation has low operating costs and high fixed costs, which along with its relative
inflexibility makes it ideal to meet baseload demand.  Because it is slow to ramp up it is not a good alternative when
demand peaks or the wind does not blow as expected.
22 Coal-fired generation is added only if it is utilized at least 85 per cent of the time.  If additional capacity is required,
but it would not be in operation more than 85 per cent of the time, the additional capacity added is gas-fired.  This
avoids our results being distorted by adding coal-fired generation to meet peak demand in the north.
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scrutiny of alternative points of view and provides a forum for public debate. The
process also requires the regulator, through written decisions, to provide their rationale
for each decision. This is an important constraint on the potential for collusion between
the decision maker and private interests. These advantages will depend upon the extent to
which the regulator is at arm’s-length from the government.
There are also disadvantages to following a regulatory process in approving a major
transmission project, including the fact that it is often costly and the decisions may not
be timely. Unilateral government action on such a decision is likely to provide a superior
solution only if there is widespread agreement of a problem, time is of the essence and if
the cost of not addressing the problem is far more expensive than exploring alternatives.
Our results, showing that the two proposed HVDC lines are economically inefficient and
unwarranted given the AESO’s assumptions and forecasts, point to the benefit of a
regulatory process, and raise doubts that the state of reliability and supply adequacy
indicate the need for an emergency response. Indeed, if an emergency existed, the
generation-only solution to manage the transfer constraint on the north-south corridor can
be implemented faster than construction of the two HVDC lines. Such conclusions show
the benefits of a regulatory process. Even if the existing regulatory process is judged to
be dysfunctional or a major hindrance to generation development and expansion of the
transmission grid, a better response may be to make changes to that process rather than
bypassing it.
1.2 The Context of the Study and Qualifications
Given the importance of electricity to the welfare of Albertans, and the political sensitivities to
transmission policy, it is important for us to emphasize what this paper does not do and what
we do not conclude. 
(i) This study is not a critique of the existing market design and institutions in Alberta. It
does, however, raise specific questions and concerns about the government’s
transmission policy in general, and Bill 50 specifically. We illustrate that those concerns
might well be material by considering the economics of the two HVDC lines proposed
for the Edmonton-Calgary corridor. We do not comment about the three other CTI
projects in Bill 50.
There might be other benefits associated with the two HVDC lines not captured by our
analysis which would make the economics of these two lines more favourable.  In the
study we comment on whether reliability or mitigation of market power might be two
such benefits. 
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The market power concern is that reinforcement of the north-south line is necessary to
avoid the exercise of market power in southern Alberta. This is a possibility, though it is
not obvious, given the anticipated extent of wind generation and investments required to
firm it up. There are two relevant questions. First, is the cost of market power greater
than $1.7 billion to $1.9 billion? The benefit from disciplining market power by
installing the two HVDC lines must exceed its cost for market power considerations to
justify the two HVDC lines. However, it is not sufficient to conclude that the two HVDC
lines are economic because they control market power. The second question that needs to
be asked is whether there are other cheaper alternatives to mitigate the development of
market power in southern Alberta. If there are, then the two HVDC lines remain
uneconomic.
A second suggested benefit is that the two HVDC lines are necessary to meet reliability
requirements. It is important to distinguish between the costs of congestion and the costs
of unreliability. Our analysis measures the cost of congestion, while maintaining current
reliability requirements.
A particular concern is that the development of congestion and/or a more efficient
congestion policy in the transmission grid would lead to a redesign of the market that
would be costly. While this may or may not be true, it is not sufficient to merely assert
that any redesign instituted because of congestion or implementation of a different
congestion policy would be costly. Instead it is necessary to show that the costs from
redesign would exceed the extra costs associated with the congestion-free policy
(e.g., the $1.7 billion to $1.9 billion incremental cost of the two HVDC lines versus a
generation-only solution, but this is only the cost associated with the two HVDC lines
proposed for the Edmonton-Calgary corridor, not the incremental cost associated with
implementing a congestion-free policy over the entire transmission grid).23 Our results
simply show that the costs of a congestion-free policy, in terms of the costs of delivered
electricity, can be substantial.
Prebuilding transmission in advance to increase investment in generation, strengthening
the system to increase intertie capacity, the mitigation of market power, and minimization
of land impact and rights of way are examples of other benefits that have been suggested.
However, for these considerations to overturn our conclusion that the two HVDC lines
are inefficient, it is necessary to establish that the benefits not counted in our analysis are
worth more than $1.7 billion to $1.9 billion, and that those benefits cannot be achieved
by a less expensive alternative. 
23 It is important to recall that our focus is on the resource cost of providing electricity to Albertans.  We do not include
the possibility that the current market design if congestion increases, or changes to the market design in response to
congestion, would result in large transfers from consumers to generators. We suspect, and would hope, that if
congestion or the response to congestion resulted in significant transfers from consumers to generators, the market
design would be changed.  Otherwise consumers are being asked to incur, in the case of the two HVDC lines, an
additional cost of $1.7 to $1.9 billion to avoid the transfer.  As per the discussion in the text, a better response might
be to change the market rules or market design.
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(ii) This study does not conclude that the Alberta experience with regulatory restructuring
and the introduction of competition and market forces into the AIES is a failure. 
(iii) This study does not propose specific policies to address the following:
(a) What should the pricing of transmission be in Alberta?
(b) What should the process be for planning and approval of transmission 
investment in Alberta?
These are important issues. Given the time and resources available our objective was
much simpler: are the two HVDC lines as proposed in Bill 50 good for Albertans or is
there at least one alternative that might be better? If so, then it appears to us that the
abbreviated and limited scrutiny of this CTI are a disservice to Albertans.  Moreover, this
study is clearly not the study, but a study. It should lead to additional studies where the
answers to these questions can be explored and a debate over the alternatives can proceed
in the proper forums.
(iv) We do not conclude that any north-south reinforcement of the transmission grid is
inefficient or not required. We do not conclude that a generation-only solution is optimal.
A mix of generation and transmission expansion may be optimal. We are not against
transmission. We are against transmission projects, like the two HVDC lines that, on the
basis of our analysis, cost Albertans $1.7 to $1.9 billion more than is required. Our
conclusion is that the large cost and capacity of the two HVDC lines, 4,000 megawatts,
is an overbuild that is not warranted by its economics.
1.3 Plan of the Study
Section 2 is a review and analysis of transmission policy in Alberta. Section 3 assesses the two
HVDC lines proposed for the Calgary-Edmonton corridor. Section 4 is a short discussion of the
advantages of a public regulatory process.
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2.0 TRANSMISSION AND TRANSMISSION POLICY IN ALBERTA
This section provides an introduction to the complexity of electricity and why its physical
characteristics make regulatory restructuring of electric networks more difficult than other
sectors where functions can be physically separated, unlike electricity. It then describes and
analyzes the existing regulatory policy and framework for transmission pricing and investment.
2.1 Electricity is Different
In order to maintain a reliable electricity system, the balance between demand and supply of
electricity must be maintained at every point on the system at all times. Since demand and
supply vary constantly and can be unpredictable, this requires continual monitoring and
coordination between generation and consumption.
Transmission of electricity is not just transportation. Instead, transmission plays a fundamental
role in coordinating the efficient supply of reliable electricity by integrating multiple
generation facilities. The separation of transmission from generation is not as straightforward
as in gas or telecommunications. In the case of electricity there are important operating
complementarities between transmission and generation. In order to keep the network
operational, generation decisions cannot be made independently. In addition, there is no direct
link between the energy supplied by a single source at one location and the energy consumed at
another location.  How a particular consumer is served depends on the behaviour of other
suppliers and other demands on the electric network. 
These considerations mean that there will be network externalities. The capacity and cost of
using transmission facilities will depend on the behaviour of others—other suppliers and
consumers of electricity. The interaction is sufficiently complicated that defining property
rights in transmission and relying only on markets is not likely to result in an efficient and
reliable network. There are also important investment complementarities between generation
and transmission. The location and size of generating plants are influenced by the
interconnections provided by the transmission system. Conversely, the location and amount of
generation affects transmission capacity. Changes in transmission capacity can impact both the
costs incurred by individual generating units and the value of these generating units. It is the
network externalities that mean the economic separation of function is not a physical
separation. An electric system is an integrated physical machine.
2.2 Transmission Policy in Alberta
Transmission policy with regard to investment and pricing in Alberta has been set by the
government. It is detailed in the white paper on transmission policy, Transmission
Development: The Right Path for Alberta, and the Transmission Regulation under the Electric
Utilities Act.24
24 Alberta Regulation 86/2007.
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2.2.1  TRANSMISSION PRICING
The transmission regulatory framework was a response to the Congestion Management
Principles decision by the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) in 2002.25 Prior to that
decision, system transmission costs were allocated (approximately) 50 per cent to load and
50 per cent to generators.26 The Electric Utilities Act mandates that transmission rates for load
(consumers of electricity) must not differ because of location. Rates that are not a function of
location, and hence distance, are known as postage stamp rates. Prior to the Congestion
Management Principles decision, the rate design to recover the system transmission costs
allocated to generators involved postage stamp rates.
In its Congestion Management decision, the AEUB determined that location-based charges for
the recovery of system enhancements was important to ensure incentives were established to
minimize the costs of delivered power (i.e., generation and transmission costs). It is worth
quoting the AEUB on its rationale:27
Most parties agreed that the congestion management principles approved by
the Board should have the objective of permitting customers to realize the
lowest delivered cost of energy. The Board agrees that the cost of delivered
energy is an important objective to be considered in the design of congestion
management principles. 
. . . . .
As an overriding principle, the Board considers that the development of
competitive markets in the deregulated generation and retail sectors coupled
with regulated transmission and distribution sectors that harness market forces
to the greatest extent possible will maximize the likelihood of achieving an
efficient overall cost to customers. 
The focus of the congestion management proceeding is on the deregulated
generation and the regulated transmission sectors, the combined costs of
which, for the purposes of this proceeding, the Board has referred to as the
delivered cost of energy. The Board recognizes and acknowledges that this
“delivered cost of energy” covers only a portion, albeit a large portion, of the
overall cost to customers. 
The difficulties of achieving an efficient cost of delivered energy results from
the fact that the generation and transmission sectors do not operate
independently of each other. For example, a least cost transmission system
may limit the development of an efficient generation market. As a
consequence, it may not be appropriate to minimize transmission costs if that
adversely impacts the development of a more competitive generation market
resulting in a higher delivered cost of energy. On the other hand, having no
regard to the cost of transmission facilities to accommodate new and existing
generation may also result in a higher delivered cost of energy. 
25 AEUB Decision 2002-099.
26 System transmission costs can be thought of as the cost of facilities that are shared. They are not specific to
interconnecting a generator. See Transmission Development Policy Paper at p. 5. What we refer to as system
transmission is sometimes called bulk transmission.  The cost allocation between generators and load was
implemented in 2000.  Under regulation, load was allocated most of these costs. 
27 AEUB Decision 2002-099 at pp. 29-30.
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Prior to 1996, central planners attempted to achieve economic and timely
expansion of the transmission system in concert with growth in generation and
load, with a view to obtaining the lowest cost of reliably delivered energy for
consumers. The Board considers that, under restructuring, market forces
should be used to the greatest extent possible and central planning should be
minimized. 
The Board considers it important that transmission rates be designed to
facilitate competition and promote economic siting decisions by generators.
The Board is of the view that the best way of achieving these objectives is to
provide individual generators with appropriate locational transmission cost
signals, and then let the market deliver the resulting lowest combined cost of
generation and transmission. 
The Board considers that the pricing signals should be fair, transparent, and
predictable so as to minimize interference in the generation market and
provide generation investors with a reasonable degree of regulatory certainty.
In summary, by providing generators with appropriate transmission cost
signals, the market is expected to deliver the lowest delivered cost of energy
to customers.
The AEUB directed the Transmission Administrator (TA) to file location-based tariffs under
which the generators’ share of all system upgrades would be recovered by zonal
interconnection charges on generators in zones that benefited from the expansion in
transmission.28 These were demand charges (i.e., fixed $/MW), intended to send strong
locational signals to generators.29
The government responded with its transmission policy which reversed location-based pricing.
Indeed, it went further, allocating all system costs to load. The reversal was based on the
premise that transmission should be unconstrained, facilitating investments in generation and
competition in the energy market.30
The Transmission Regulation sets out the government’s policy with respect to transmission
pricing:31
(i) Generators are charged their local interconnection costs, must bear location-based line
losses and are required to make a contribution to system upgrades. 
(ii) All other costs are recovered through postage stamp tolls on load.
28 The Transmission Administrator (TA) was responsible for the planning and operation of the transmission grid under
amendments to the Electric Utilities Act in 1998. Amendments in 2003 abolished the TA and rolled its functions into
the Power Pool, creating the Alberta Electric System Operator.
29 AEUB Decision 2002-099 pp. 83-85.
30 See “Minister Proposes Transmission Policy,” IPPSA News 9(3) at p. 3, 2003.
31 See in particular, Section 47.
Analysis of Transmission Pricing Policy and Regulation in Alberta: Locational Signals
The price of system access should reflect the costs of providing service. In the short run, there
are two marginal costs associated with providing transmission service. These are line losses
and the costs of congestion. The costs of congestion are the costs of re-dispatch.  The costs of
re-dispatch are the difference between the costs of the in-merit generator and the costs of the
higher cost, out-of-merit generator that replaces it because of the transmission constraint.32 In
the long run, the costs of the grid (i.e., the cost of the facilities required to provide service),
must be recovered.
Three provisions of the Transmission Regulation appear to suggest some location-based elements
to the transmission pricing framework. These are local interconnection costs, line losses and
system contribution. In addition, there are non-tariff locational signals. These include congestion
and delays in being connected, which are not intended to provide locational signals. The objective
of the transmission policy is a congestion-free transmission system where generators are able to
connect without constraint on the ability to provide energy. While generators are responsible for
their local interconnection charges, the debate over locational signals is not about local
interconnection costs, but rather allocation and recovery of system transmission costs.
Under the Generator System Contribution requirement, new generators are required to pay a
per MW charge for interconnection that depends upon their location. The province is divided
into six regions. For all regions, there is a base charge of $10,000/MW. In regions where
generation exceeds load, there is an additional charge that can be as high as $40,000/MW.33
Line losses are energy losses due to heat from resistance to electrical current flow on the
transmission lines. As power flow increases, the line losses also increase. As more power
moves from one area on the transmission grid to another, line losses will increase. Generators
that locate in a region that is already making heavy use of the transmission grid will impose
higher line losses on the system than if they locate in a region where the system is used less
intensively. Since generators in Alberta pay the cost of line losses, it has been argued that line
losses provide an adequate locational signal.
The effectiveness of the two pricing mechanisms that might send a locational signal with
respect to system transmission costs, Generator System Contribution and line losses, has been
questioned. There are two reasons why the strength of the location-based signal provided by
the Generator System Contribution is very weak. First, the highest possible fee, $50,000/MW,
is a very small fraction of the estimated cost of constructing a power plant.34 Second, the
Generator System Contribution is refundable over the 10-year period after commercial
operation date. The refund involves an annual payment back to the generator if it met its
annual capacity factor target for that year. Failure to meet the annual capacity factor forfeits
that year’s refund. If the generator meets all of its annual capacity factor targets it recovers all
of its system contribution. Though generator system contribution is intended to provide a
means to recover the costs of shared facilities, it does not in fact do so.
32 This is also the lost profit of the marginal out-of-merit unit in the low-cost region not sold because of the
transmission constraint. Hence, it is the opportunity cost of the marginal unit in-merit in the low-cost region.
33 See AESO, Generator System Contribution Policy, February 11, 2009 for details.
34 $50,000/MW is just over 1.5 per cent of the AESO’s estimated “overnight” capital cost of constructing a brownfield
coal plant. See AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan, June 2009, at p. 251,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf. A brownfield coal plant is located at an existing
site and hence has lower costs than a plant located at a new site (a greenfield plant). 
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It has also been argued that the implementation of the location-based line loss charges is not
very effective.35 Among other things, the Transmission Regulation places significant
constraints on the extent to which line loss charges can vary across locations. When coupled
with the relatively small size of all line losses, this casts considerable doubt on the
effectiveness of present line loss charges to influence the location decisions of generators.
Moreover, there is an inherent contradiction in expecting line losses to guide location decisions
when a key factor used to assess whether expansion of the transmission grid is in the public
interest is high line losses. It is doubtful generators will avoid locations with high line losses.
A policy of zero congestion on the transmission grid further undercuts the use of line losses as
a locational signal because generators know that constraints must be relieved, and when they
are, their loss charges will decline.36
Line losses are not really an appropriate instrument, in any event, for guiding location
decisions. Location decisions are “long-run” and involve the expenditure of significant sunk
capital, whereas line loss costs are volatile and difficult to predict without knowledge of where
future generators will locate on the system. The addition of even small generators at many
locations can cause substantial changes in the line loss costs at that location and at nearby
locations. Line loss costs are not sufficiently predictable or stable enough to be factored into
decisions of where to place generation sites. They do not reflect the costs of shared facilities or
congestion costs. 
Existing tariffs for access to the transmission grid fail to promote the efficient of the grid in the
short run since they do not reflect marginal line losses and congestion costs. And because they
do not reflect the long-run costs of providing service to a location, they fail to promote the
efficient development of the grid and efficient location of generators.
Analysis of Transmission Pricing Policy and Regulation in Alberta: Implications
The costs of system transmission are primarily recovered through postage stamp tolls paid by
load. This means that the AESO cannot discriminate by customer location and that the share of
system transmission costs recovered from generators is minimal. Moreover, the share of system
transmission costs recovered from generators is not recovered through a tariff that provides a
strong signal that reflects the impact on system costs of a generator’s location decision.
Generators face a price for system access that is only faintly reflective, if at all, of the costs
they impose on the bulk transmission system. Generators located far from load and those that
create congestion on the grid will impose higher costs on the system or bulk transmission grid
than generators located close to load and that do not create congestion. 
35 See ENMAX, Fostering the Efficient Development of Alberta’s Electricity Infrastructure through Changes to the
Transmission Regulation, May 2008, and G. Angevine and A. Boik, Alberta Electricity Transmission Policy for the
Next Generation, Fraser Institute Studies in Energy Policy, March 2009.
36 An indication that loss charges are not providing an effective locational signal is provided by the draft loss factors for
2010. These show that the loss charges to the generators that are most often dispatched to resolve congestion using
Transmission Must Run (TMR) (the Rainbow and Fort Nelson generators) are in fact higher than the system average
loss charges and in the case of Fort Nelson are the highest charges to any generator in the system. See AESO
Operating Policies and Procedures Transmission OPP 501 at http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/OPP_501.pdf and AESO
Draft Loss Factors for 2010 at http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/Draft_Loss_Factor_2010.pdf.
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The consequence of having system access prices for generators that are small and not reflective
of transmission costs is that competition among generators will essentially minimize the costs
only of generation (which can be thought of as including the direct costs of interconnection to
the grid). Generators can locate in large part independent of system transmission costs because
those costs are borne by load. The existing transmission pricing policy could easily create
excessive demand for expansion of system transmission facilities to serve lower-cost
generation that is far from load, and result in a competitive disadvantage for generation located
closer to load. The result would be an inefficient mix of transmission and generation assets,
raising the total costs (generation and transmission) of the AIES that must be recovered from
load or, in other words, Albertans. 
An important policy objective should be a regulatory structure that results in the minimization
of the total cost of delivered electricity.37 This involves minimizing the sum of generation and
transmission costs (as well as external costs such as environmental damage), where
transmission costs include both the costs of congestion and transmission facilities. The problem
with not having locational pricing signals tied to the costs that are imposed on the transmission
system is that it results in a subsidy to high-transmission cost generation: generation that would
not be competitive if it had to recover the costs it imposes on the grid. Consequently, the
present transmission policy can lead to distortions in the price of electricity.
While it is true that in a competitive market, the ultimate incidence of all costs falls on
consumers, the magnitude of the costs so borne is not exogenous. Rather it depends upon who
pays the cost of transmission. If generators pay the incremental cost they impose on the
system, then they have incentives to minimize their total costs of supply, both transmission and
generation. If load pays any incremental costs of transmission created by a generator,
generators no longer have incentives to minimize the cost of transmission, resulting in higher
total costs.
2.2.2  TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT
The Transmission Regulation specifies “robustness” requirements that impose a design standard
on the transmission grid for the AESO.38 The standard has two components. First, under normal
operating conditions, “all anticipated in-merit” generation can be dispatched 100 per cent of the
time when all transmission facilities are in service. Second, at least 95 per cent of the time “all
anticipated in-merit” generation can be dispatched under abnormal operating conditions (i.e.,
when some transmission facilities are not available). The Transmission Regulation makes it 
37 While maintaining acceptable levels of reliability. If this objective is not met, there will be pressure for institutional
and market reform. 
38 Transmission Regulations at 15(1)(e) and (f).
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clear that the ability of the AESO to resort to “non-wire” solutions to meet the demand of load
is limited. In accordance with the Transmission Policy paper, the government’s objective is
congestion-free transmission.39
Before Bill 50, the regulatory approval process for new transmission investment involved the
following:
(i) The AESO is required by Section 34 of the Electric Utilities Act to prepare and submit a
Needs Identification Document (NID) to the AUC. This document presents the AESO’s
case for why the transmission enhancement or expansion is necessary to alleviate a
constraint, improve efficiency and reduce line losses, or respond to requests for system
access. 
(ii) The AUC can approve, deny, or send the NID back for revision. If the AUC agrees that
the transmission enhancement or expansion is necessary to alleviate a constraint, improve
efficiency and reduce line losses, or respond to requests for system access, it must then
determine whether approval is in the public interest as required by Section 17 of the
Electric Utilities Act.40 Section 38 of the Transmission Regulation instructs the AUC to
look favourably on transmission investments that foster a competitive generation market,
or contribute to its robustness by noting that these effects are in the public interest. The
AUC is to consider the AESO’s assessment as correct unless an intervener demonstrates
a technical deficiency or if approval of the NID would not be in the public interest. This
is a significant hurdle for interveners since they seldom have access to the same level of
information or resources as the AESO. 
39 It is worth highlighting the government’s presentation of its robustness criteria in the Transmission Development
Paper (at p. 8). This makes clear that the government expects the AESO will plan and oversee the development of a
transmission grid in which congestion is rare:
The open access transmission structure in Alberta consists of an implicit system of
injection and withdrawal rights for generators and loads. There are no explicit
transmission rights. Given this structure, the transmission system must be relatively
congestion free or the underlying market model will not function effectively. 
The ISO must therefore proactively plan transmission development to achieve this
result of “congestion-free” transmission. The ISO will be required to ensure that the
transmission system internal to Alberta is appropriately reinforced so that under normal
operating conditions (i.e. all transmission facilities in service) all in-merit generation
can be dispatched and virtually all economic wholesale transactions may be realized
without congestion. 
Given the lumpiness of transmission additions, the 95% criterion is intended to be a
guideline and not an absolute number. Congestion may occur during planned
maintenance, forced outages of transmission facilities and/or some critical generation
facilities. It is also essential that the transmission system be sufficiently robust to allow
timely and appropriate maintenance of transmission facilities. 
. . . . . . 
In our market model, it is critical in the relatively few cases where transmission
constraints are not removed, real time congestion arrangements should not set or
distort market prices. [Emphasis added.]
40 See AUC Decision 2009-126.
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(iii) Section 34 approval triggers an application by the Transmission Facilities Owner (TFO)
for facility approval under the Hydro and Electric Energy Act (HEEA). Section 19 of the
HEEA gives the AUC the power to require changes in the plans, specifications or
location of a transmission line, and to prescribe the location, route and extent of right-of-
way for a transmission line.
Analysis of Transmission Investment Regulation in Alberta: The Zero-Congestion Fallacy 41
Given the importance of the congestion-free policy, it is important to understand why it is
inefficient. Transmission lines are examples of facilities where demand is not constant, but
variable.42 Transmission lines have two characteristics that preclude the ability to adjust
capacity to meet demand by increasing it in peak periods and decreasing it in off-peak periods.
These are capital intensity and specificity. Capital intensity implies that efficient additions to
capacity require time. Specificity relates to the fact that transmission lines, like other major
infrastructure, are a capital investment that cannot be redeployed for another use. These
characteristics are important because electricity is not (easily) storable creating the following
dilemma. Capacity installed to meet peak period demand would not be used in off-peak
periods. On the other hand, while reductions in capacity reduce the costs of providing service,
they also result in congestion problems during peak periods.43 That is, in peak periods
transmission is congested and some generators may not be able to supply all the power they
wish. Instead, out-of-merit, higher-cost local generators will be dispatched, giving rise to
congestion costs.  The optimal level of capacity will trade off the costs of unused capacity in
off-peak periods against the congestion costs from not having sufficient capacity during peak
periods. At the optimal level of capacity, the marginal cost of capacity will equal the costs of
congestion eliminated by the marginal unit of capacity. 
To have a congestion-free system, transmission capacity must be installed to meet the peak demand
of generators. However, most of the time demand for transmission capacity will be less and the
marginal transmission capacity will hardly ever be used. Still, it must be paid for. This is likely
never efficient: the cost of the extra transmission capacity is likely more than the congestion costs.
Steven Stoft observes that one of the reasons zero congestion sounds attractive as a policy goal
is because of confusion between congestion and unreliability.44 In a congested system, load
downstream of the transmission line that is constrained are served by more expensive local
generation.  A system is unreliable if downstream of the constrained transmission line, local
generation is insufficient to meet load and some customers have to reduce their use of
electricity. The costs of unreliability are much more since load must be rationed: the costs of
rationing are the lost profits or consumption benefits from reducing electricity use. It is the
costs of congestion, not unreliability, that we focus on in our analysis of the economics of the
two HVDC lines in the next section of this study. The two alternatives we compare, the two
HVDC lines and a generation-only solution, both meet current reliability requirements.
41 See S. Stoft (2006), “Problems of Transmission Investment in a Deregulated Power Market,” Competitive Electricity
Markets and Sustainability, ed. F. Leveque, Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, pp. 87-130.
42 The following is based on J. Church and R. Ware (2000), Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, New York:
McGraw-Hill, Section 25.3.
43 We ignore line losses in this discussion for simplicity.
44 See S. Stoft (2006), “Problems of Transmission Investment in a Deregulated Power Market,” Competitive Electricity
Markets and Sustainability, ed. F. Leveque, Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, pp. 87-130.
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The congestion-free transmission policy suggests three hypotheses: 
(i) The zero congestion policy precludes efficient substitution between transmission (wire)
solutions and non-wire (generation and/or load response) solutions. That is, it doesn’t
contribute to minimizing the total cost of delivered electricity, but only the cost of
generation. It explicitly appears to reject that a higher-cost generation unit with lower-cost
transmission may be preferred over a lower-cost generator with higher transmission costs. 
(ii) Second, the bias towards transmission wires is done in a particularly costly way by
mandating that all in-merit generation be dispatched (i.e., not constrained down), under
virtually all conditions, including peak north-south flows.
(iii) Third, the mandate for a congestion-free transmission grid ignores that the costs of
attaining that objective might be greater than the benefits.
Bill 50
Bill 50 introduces the following changes:
(i) The requirement under Section 17 of the Alberta Utilities Commission Act requiring the
AUC to consider the public interest under the Hydro and Electric Energy Act does not
apply to CTI. Moreover, Section 19 of the Hydro and Electric Energy Act is amended to
make it explicit that the AUC cannot refuse approval of a transmission line deemed CTI
“on the basis that, in its opinion, the project does not meet the needs of Alberta or is not
in the public interest.”
(ii) Section 34 of the Electric Utilities Act does not apply to CTI. Instead, these transmission
facilities are approved or designated by the government and the AESO must follow up by
ensuring that an application is made to the regulator for approval under the Hydro and
Electric Energy Act.
2.2.3  CONCLUSION
Our analysis suggests the following predictions:
(i) It is likely that there will be demand for transmission expansion for which the costs
outweigh the benefits. 
(ii) The result will be an electric system that has an inefficient mix of generation and
transmission, leading to a higher-than-necessary cost of delivered electricity.
(iii) The logic of equating the public interest with congestion-free transmission is inefficient. 
Our analysis of Bill 50 in the next section is consistent with these three hypotheses. We
demonstrate the magnitude of the inefficiency by showing that the costs of the two HVDC
lines mandated as CTI under Bill 50 far exceed our estimates of their benefit.
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3.0 ASSESSING THE TWO HVDC LINES IN THE EDMONTON-CALGARY CORRIDOR
In this section we compare the costs of a generation-only solution with the proposed two
HVDC lines deemed critical between Edmonton and Calgary. We begin with a brief review of
the AESO’s application for reinforcement in 2004, followed by a discussion of our
methodology. The next part discusses assumptions and is followed by a cost comparison of the
cost of generation re-dispatch and gas-fired generation expansion in the south to coal-fired
generation expansion in the north combined with the proposed HVDC transmission
reinforcement. A final part discusses other relevant considerations and qualifications.
3.1 Transmission Reinforcement in the Edmonton-Calgary Corridor
The need for transmission reinforcement between Edmonton and Calgary was anticipated in
2004 when the AESO filed an Edmonton-Calgary 500 kV Transmission Development Need
Application.45 In that application, the AESO forecast a need for transmission reinforcements
arising in 2009. Thirteen alternative transmission reinforcements were evaluated as potential
solutions. Capital costs (in $2004) of these alternatives ranged from a low of $359 million to a
high of $766 million. The lowest capital cost was for two double circuit 240 kV lines between
Edmonton and Calgary. The highest capital cost was for a 500 kV HVDC line with 1,500 MW
of transfer capability. The AESO’s preferred option was to build two 500 kV AC transmission
lines between Edmonton and Calgary at an estimated capital cost of $553 million. This
alternative received regulatory approval in 2005, but the authorization was subsequently voided
in 2007.  The AESO has indicated that since the 2004 application, system improvements and
lower than forecasted rates of load growth have delayed the anticipated need for reinforcement
of the Edmonton to Calgary transmission path to 2014.46
In its 2004 need application, the AESO indicated that no technical studies of HVDC (high
voltage direct current) transmission were carried out because the technology was considered
more expensive than alternating current (AC) solutions for medium distance applications such
as the 300-kilometre path from Edmonton to Calgary.47 In its 2009 Long-term Transmission
System Plan, the AESO also discusses HVDC transmission, noting that “DC for overhead
lines is generally more economic than AC when the transmission distance is greater than
700 kilometres (km).” 48
The two 500 kV HVDC transmission lines currently proposed are estimated to cost $3.135
billion ($2008). In 2004, the AESO’s preferred alternative to meet the anticipated need for
north-south transmission was to build two 500 kV AC transmission lines between Edmonton
and Calgary at less than one-fifth the cost in real dollars (approximately $590 million ($2008)).
45 Edmonton-Calgary 500 kV Transmission Development — Need Application No:1346298, May 7, 2004.
46 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Edmonton to Calgary transmission reinforcements — p. 6, June
2009, http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
47 Edmonton-Calgary 500 kV Transmission Development — Need Application No: 1346298, Section 4.3.2 — Technical
Evaluation, p. 44, May 7, 2004.
48 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix I, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
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3.2 Study Methodology
The proposed HVDC transmission reinforcements between Edmonton and southern Alberta are
expected to enter service in 2013.49 It is assumed that these reinforcements will resolve any
further congestion until 2028. This study compares the NPV of costs between 2013 and 2028
for the proposed north-south HVDC transmission upgrades, unconstrained generation dispatch
and pattern of generation expansion with those for constrained generation dispatch and pattern
of generation expansion without the transmission upgrades to the north-south path. The two
cases considered are:
(i) Bill 50 [Unconstrained]
Under this case, the two HVDC lines are built, adding 4,000 MW of transmission
capacity and we assume that transmission is unconstrained. Incremental generation is
coal-fired and added to the north.
(ii) Generation Only [Constrained]
In this case, transmission capacity in the north-south corridor remains at current levels.
Initially all new generation capacity is assumed to be coal added in the north. Dispatch is
assumed to be unconstrained and the resultant north-south power flows are determined. If
the power flows exceed the current threshold limit, the province is split into a northern
region and a southern region. Each region is then re-dispatched based on its own dispatch
order such that the maximum north-south flow is not exceeded. New generation is only
required in the south if the north-south flows required to meet load exceed the maximum
threshold value.
In order to focus on the relative cost of the two solutions in addressing the expected
transmission congestion, we assume that the AESO’s expected supply adequacy requirement is
met in both cases. As the AESO notes, generation in Alberta is not planned, but competitive,
and there is not a regulated requirement for a reserve margin. Instead the AESO expects that
market signals will operate to ensure there is an Effective Reserve Margin (ERM) of 10 per cent.50
The ERM is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the installed thermal generation capacity,
20 per cent of the installed wind and irrigation hydro capacity, 33 per cent of the legacy hydro,
and 50 per cent of new hydro capacity to the annual peak Alberta Internal Load (AIL), minus
one. The current ERM is approximately 16.3 per cent.
The modeling exercise has three components:
(i) Dispatch Model. The dispatch model selects the generation assets that are dispatched to
meet load. 
49 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Executive Summary, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
50 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix E, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.  The ERM is a
measure of installed generating capacity above forecast peak load for a year.
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(ii) Power Flow Model. The power flow model used was obtained from the AESO. To study
the effects on north-south transfers only, increases in system load from 2008 were
assigned to either the 500 kV bus at Genesee in the north or the 240 kV bus at the Janet
substation near Calgary in the south. System load increases are apportioned to either the
north or south buses based on the existing split between south area and north area loads
in the province. Similarly, new generation additions in all simulations are assigned to
either the 500 kV bus at Genesee in the north or the 240 kV bus at Janet near Calgary in
the south. By aggregating the load and generation increases at these two buses,
transmission congestion issues extraneous to the Edmonton-Calgary corridor are
eliminated from consideration. 
The interaction of the dispatch and power flow model determines the magnitude and
location of incremental generation. Given target capacity, generation is added, while the
power flow model determines in which region and what type of capacity is added. 
(iii) Cost Model. For each case, we estimated the annual variable costs of generation based on
dispatch (other than wind and hydro which are common to all cases). We also calculated
the annual fixed costs for incremental generation capacity, since existing capacity and
that under construction is common across all cases. The costs (in $2008) calculated for
each year are discounted back to 2008.
3.3 Assumptions
To the extent possible, the assumptions we make track those made by the AESO in its long-
term plan. This section discusses the nature and rationale of the assumptions underlying the
analysis.
3.3.1  LOAD GROWTH AND PROFILE
The need for transmission reinforcements and new generation is predicated on a forecast of
growing load. Higher rates of load growth mean transmission reinforcements and generation
additions are needed sooner. Lower rates of load growth mean the need for transmission
reinforcements and generation additions may be delayed. 
Historical annual energy (MWh) and peak demand (MW) values for the Alberta Internal Load
(AIL) and the Alberta Interconnected Electric System (AIES) load between 2000 and 2007 are
given in the AESO’s Long-term Transmission System Plan.51 The AIL load represents all
Alberta consumers, while the customer demand on the transmission grid (the AIES load) is
lower because it subtracts the so-called “behind-the-fence load” that is served locally by on-site
generation.
51 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix C, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
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Growth figures given in the Long-term Transmission System Plan show that from 2003 to
2007, AIL energy grew between 0.4 per cent and 4.6 per cent per year. AIL peak demand over
the same period grew between 0.5 per cent and 3.7 per cent per year. Annual energy growth for
the transmission grid (AIES load) from 2003 to 2007 varied between 0.47 per cent and 3.1 per cent.
Growth in AIES peak demand over the same period varied between 0.6 per cent and 3.4 per cent
per year. The most recent load growth figures show that between 2006 and 2007 AIL energy
grew by 0.4 per cent and peak demand grew by 0.5 per cent, while AIES energy load grew by
0.47 per cent and AIES peak demand grew by 0.6 per cent.
Hourly load values for the AIL in 2008 and year-to-date 2009 are available from the AESO’s
website.52 These numbers show that energy load growth in 2008 over 2007 was 0.4 per cent.
However, 2008 was a leap year. On a normal year basis, the load growth in 2008 was 0.1 per
cent. Peak demand in 2008 grew by 0.4 per cent over 2007. From Jan. 1 to Aug. 1, 2009, the
data shows that the AIL declined on a year-over-year basis at an annual growth rate of -0.2 per cent.
This is summarized in the Table 1.
TABLE 1
AIL Load 2003-August 2009 AIES Load 2003-2007
The AESO’s 2007 and 2008 forecast of load growth are given in Appendix C of their Long-
term Transmission System Plan. The growth rates in the 2007 forecast are lower than the 2008
forecast but these both show increasing growth in both energy and peak demand between 2009
and 2012. For this study, we adopted the AESO's 2007 forecast of AIES load growth shown in
Table 3.1-1 of the Long Term Transmission System Plan and chose 2009 as the base year. The
base year consists of actual hourly recorded loads for the first 32 weeks of the year, while for
the last 20 weeks, the 2008 actual values have been inflated by the AESO’s forecast growth
rate. Future loads are determined by applying the AESO’s forecast of annual percentage growth
in energy and peak demand load for the AIES load. The resulting forecast of AIES energy and
peak demand is shown in Appendix A.
The load profile for a year is created by mapping each of the 8,760 hours of the year into one
of 12 cases. The 12 cases are high, medium and low loads for each of the four seasons, winter,
spring, summer and fall. 
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Year Energy Growth Peak Demand Growth
(GWh) (MW)
2003 62716 5.5% 8967 4.6%
2004 65259 4.1% 9236 3.0%
2005 66268 1.5% 9580 3.7%
2006 69371 4.7% 9661 0.8%
2007 69660 0.4% 9710 0.5%
2008 Act 69946 0.4% 9806 1.0%
2008 Adj 69746 0.1% 9806 1.0%
2009 YTD 42178 -0.2% — —
Year Energy Growth Peak Demand Growth
(GWh) (MW)
2003 53169 -0.9% 7650 1.3%
2004 54669 2.8% 7910 3.4%
2005 55697 1.9% 8066 2.0%
2006 57433 3.1% 8177 1.4%
2007 57701 0.5% 8228 0.6%
3.3.2  COST ASSUMPTIONS
In the recent Long-term Transmission System Plan the AESO has provided a table of Levelized
Unit Electricity Costs (LUEC) for different types of generation.53 This table breaks out capital
costs, operating and maintenance (O&M) costs, fuel costs, greenhouse gas (GHG) offset costs,
and taxes. Elsewhere, the AESO has provided the heat rates and capacity factors assumed for
each generation type.54 As well, the AESO has provided a breakout between fixed and variable
O&M costs by generation type.55 Relevant parts of the AESO’s tables are reproduced in
Table 2 below.
TABLE 2
All types of generation incur both fixed and variable costs. The LUEC averages annual fixed
costs over the annual energy output from the generator. A key determinant of the LUEC for
different types of generation is the capacity factor assumed. The capacity factor represents the
energy produced from a generator as a fraction of the maximum possible energy produced over
a period such as a year. As the capacity factor increases, the LUEC decreases for every type of
generation. 
In Table 2, capital costs, fixed O&M costs and taxes are fixed costs. Variable O&M, fuel costs
and greenhouse gas offset costs are variable costs. If the assumed capacity factor is changed to
equal one for all generator types, then the levelized total annual fixed costs per MW of
capacity are equal to the sum of the levelized fixed costs multiplied by the number of hours in
a year (8,760). Table 3 below shows these calculations.
53 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix E, p. 255, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
54 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix E, p. 250, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
55 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix E, p. 252, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
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Generation Type Simple Combined Co- Super-Critical Integrated Super-Critical
Cycle Cycle Generation Pulverized Gasification Pulverized
Coal after Combined Coal Before 
2011 Cycle 2012
Capacity Factor 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.92 0.8 0.92
Capital Cost ($/MWh) $  94.00 $   23.00 $  16.00 $  34.00 $  51.00 $  33.00 
O&M Costs Fixed ($/MWh) $  15.00 $     3.00 $    2.00 $    5.00 $    7.00 $    5.00 
O&M Costs Variable ($/MWh) $    4.00 $     4.00 $    4.00 $    6.00 $    7.00 $    6.00 
Fuel Costs ($/MWh) $  74.00 $   53.00 $  47.00 $  10.00 $  16.00 $  10.00 
Heat Rate (Gj/MWh) 9.8   7.1 6.3 —  — —
Implied Average Real Gas Price ($/Gj) $    7.55 $    7.46 $    7.46 — — —
GHG Offset Costs ($/MWh) $    6.00 $    1.00 $  (4.00) $  29.00 $  24.00 $    8.00 
Taxes ($/MWh) $  23.00 $    4.00 $    2.00 $    8.00 $    6.00 $    8.00 
Total ($/MWh) $216.00 $  88.00 $  67.00 $  92.00 $111.00 $  70.00 
Total without Taxes ($/MWh) $193.00 $  84.00 $  65.00 $  84.00 $105.00 $  62.00 
TABLE 3
The levelized costs given in the AESO’s report are assumed to be real costs in $2008. Since
our focus is on the real resource cost of producing electricity, we ignore taxes, as these are a
transfer to government and do not represent the cost of a resource that has a next best
alternative use.
It should be noted that, given the AESO’s assumptions, after 2011 the cost of combined cycle
gas-fired generation is less than the cost of supercritical pulverized coal generation. This is true
for all capacity factors. In other words, beyond 2011, combined cycle gas-fired generation is
always less costly on a long-run unit basis than supercritical pulverized coal. As can be seen in
the table above, the variable costs of supercritical pulverized coal (before or after 2011) are
lower than the variable cost of gas-fired alternatives. 
3.3.3  EVOLUTION OF GENERATION
New Generation
Additions of new generation are necessary to meet forecast load growth and to replace
generation that has been retired. The amount, type and location of new generation added will
impact the forecast power flows on the north-south transmission path and the need for
transmission reinforcement. Following the AESO, we assume that market signals will result
in capacity equal to peak load plus 10 per cent (i.e., new generation maintains an ERM of
10 per cent) either on a provincewide basis or an area basis, depending on if the north-south
transmission constraint is binding.
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Generation Type Simple Combined Co- Super-Critical Integrated Super-Critical
Cycle Cycle Generation Pulverized Gasification Pulverized
Coal after Combined Coal Before 
2011 Cycle 2012
Capacity Factor 1 1 1 1 1 1
Capital Cost ($/MWh) $    9.40 $  13.80 $  14.40 $  31.28 $  40.80 $  30.36 
O&M Costs Fixed ($/MWh) $    1.50 $    1.80 $    1.80 $    4.60 $    5.60 $    4.60 
O&M Costs Variable ($/MWh) $    4.00 $    4.00 $    4.00 $    6.00 $    7.00 $    6.00 
Implied Average Real Gas Price ($/Gj) $    7.55 $    7.46 $    7.46 — — —
Heat Rate (Gj/MWh) 9.8 7.1 7.1 — — —
Fuel Costs ($/MWh) $  74.00 $  53.00 $  53.00 $  10.00 $  16.00 $  10.00 
GHG Offset Costs ($/MWh) $    6.00 $    1.00 $  (4.00) $  29.00 $  24.00 $    8.00 
Taxes ($/MWh) $    2.30 $    2.40 $    1.80 $    7.36 $    4.80 $    7.36 
Total ($/MWh) $  97.20 $  76.00 $  71.00 $  88.24 $  98.20 $  66.32 
Total Annual Fixed Costs $/MW $115,632.00 $157,680.00 $157,680.00 $378,782.40 $448,512.00 $370,723.20 
Total Annual Fixed Costs $  95,484.00 $136,656.00 $141,912.00 $314,308.80 $406,464.00 $306,249.60
without Taxes $/MW
Total Variable Costs $/MWh $  84.00 $  58.00 $  53.00 $  45.00 $  47.00 $  24.00 
Retirements of Existing Generation
The AESO periodically publishes Long Term Adequacy Metrics56 (LTAM) that include a list of
generation retirements and retirement dates that have been announced. The latest LTAM
indicates the Rossdale 8, 9 and 10 generators in Edmonton and the CT5 and CT8 generators in
Medicine Hat will be retired in 2009. All five of these are gas generators. In 2010, the
Wabamun 4 coal-fired generator will be retired. In this study we have included the retirements
listed in the LTAM in the year they are expected to occur.
In its Long-term Transmission System Plan, the AESO has also provided a list of generators
expected to retire by 2017 and by 2027.57 However, the year in which each of the generators is
expected to retire is not provided. It is anticipated that by 2017, in addition to the units
announced in the LTAM, Rainbow 1, 2 and 3 and Sturgeon 1 and 2 simple cycle gas-fired
generators will be retired. By 2027 it is expected that Battle River 3, 4, and 5, and Sheerness 1,
2 and the HR Milner coal-fired generators will be retired. It is assumed that the further
retirements listed in the Long-term Transmission System Plan will be replaced with generation
of similar technology and location. 
Wind Generation Additions
A key requirement for any study of north-south congestion in the Alberta system is the
depiction of future wind generation. We have adopted the AESO’s expectations for probable
wind generation development.58 This scenario foresees 6,000 MW of wind generation by
2027.59 It is expected that wind generation will be added at approximately 280 MW a year. In
this study, all new wind generation is assumed to occur in southern Alberta. The aggregate
wind production was modeled to accurately depict historical annual capacity factors as well as
regular seasonal variations and fluctuations that occur during each day. New wind generation is
aggregated and connected as a single generator at the south 240 kV bus at Janet. This
generation is offered at a price that ensures it is always dispatched.
Assumptions of type and location of new generation additions
Generation that is under construction is modeled according to its type and location. New
generation under construction or recently completed includes Cloverbar 2 and 3, CNRL Horizon,
MEG Energy and Keephills 3 in the north, and in the south the Crossfield simple cycle gas
generator and the Blue Trail wind farm. We did not include projects that have been announced
but are not yet under construction such as ENMAX’s Bonnybrook and Shepard projects.
56 AESO Long Term Adequacy Metrics — May 2009, http://www.aeso.ca/market/17855.html, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
57 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix E p. 259, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
58 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix G p. 287, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
59 This forecast does not include the impact of the Montana Alberta Tieline which will enable wind-energy producers in
Montana to sell their output into Alberta. The expected in service date of this line is early 2011. This is an
incremental source of energy into southern Alberta that would act to alleviate loading on the Edmonton to Calgary
transmission path.
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When future wind generation additions are included, further generation additions necessary to
maintain an ERM of 10 per cent, even without reinforcement of the transmission grid, can be
supercritical pulverized coal generators located in the north. We also consider a scenario where
no further wind generation is included. In this case, assuming no transmission reinforcements,
generation is added in both the south and north to maintain the AESO’s criteria of an ERM of
10 per cent in both areas. Further generation additions necessary to maintain this criterion in
the north are assumed to be a combination of supercritical pulverized coal generation and
combined cycle gas-fired generation.60 Further generation additions necessary to maintain this
ERM in the south are assumed to be combined cycle gas generators. 
New coal generation is aggregated and connected as a single generator at the north 500 kV bus
at Genesee. The offers from new coal generators are assumed to mirror the offers modeled for
the existing Genesee 3 generator.61 Gas-fired generators that are currently under construction
are modelled as separate generators and connected at either the north 500 kV bus at Genesee or
the south 240 kV bus at Janet. The offers from new gas generators are assumed to mirror the
offers of similar existing generators. The forecast of generation additions and retirements
assumed in this study are given in Appendix B.
3.3.4  GENERIC STACKING ORDER (GSO)
The dispatch of generation to meet loads affects the magnitude of power flows over various
transmission paths. In a deregulated energy-only market such as Alberta, generation is
dispatched in order of offer price, with the lowest priced offers being dispatched first. Hence,
the offer behaviour of generators affects the final dispatch and the power flows on the
transmission paths. To study power flows on a transmission path it is necessary to develop a
model of generation dispatch order or the Generic Stacking Order (GSO).
Different Approaches
In this study we have taken two approaches to model the GSO. The first approach is derived
from the GSO created by the AESO as part of their process to determine loss factors.62 This
dispatch order is based on the historically observed behaviour of generators. Generators in this
approach offer their energy in one or more blocks at ascending prices. The strength of this
approach is it reflects current dispatch patterns. However, the weakness is that it projects
current behaviour into the future, even if conditions change. The second approach is to develop
a generation dispatch order based on the estimated variable costs of different generator types.
In this approach, generators offer all their capacity in one block. The second approach assumes
all generators offer all their capability at their marginal cost of production. 
60 Some gas-fired generation is required to ensure that the capacity factor of the coal-fired generation remains above
85 per cent.
61 We use Genesee 3 since it is not governed by a power purchase arrangement (PPA) for formerly regulated plants and
hence it may be more representative of a new plant than other coal-fired plants whose dispatch rights have been
transferred through a PPA.
62 AESO Transmission — Loss Factors — Generic Stacking Order- 2008 Final, August 27, 2007,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/GSO_2008_20070727_final.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
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GSO Hydro and Wind
Development of an operational GSO required us to make assumptions regarding the treatment
of wind and hydro generation.
(i) Wind Generation
Wind generation occurs when the wind blows and is always dispatched when available: it
bids in at a price of zero. In our simulations, a model of wind generation in Alberta was
applied that accurately depicts the observed annual capacity factor as well as regular
seasonal and diurnal variations in wind generation output. Average hourly outputs are
developed based on the installed wind capacity. Hourly outputs in those hours included
in the seasonal profiles are averaged to determine the expected wind output for that
season and profile.  
The output from wind generation is variable. However, the response to this variability is
an issue that will need to be addressed whether the north-south transmission is reinforced
or not. Currently, the AESO expects that beyond 2018, energy storage will be economical
for new wind generation additions.63 We assessed the sensitivity of our results to the
assumed addition of wind and its expected availability by considering an alternative case
where we assumed that there are no further additions of wind capacity in the south.
(ii) Hydro Generation
Hydro plants on the Bow, Bighorn and Brazeau river systems dominate the hydro system
in Alberta, with a combined capacity of approximately 790 MW.64 The combined output
from these plants averages 186 MW in a normal year. However, the output in any one
hour can vary from less than 40 MW to over 460 MW. These plants have limited storage
capability and there are restrictions on how the water flows can be managed. Hydro
generation is modelled using standard hourly profiles specifying the MW dispatch for
each plant over the course of a year. Like the wind generation, the hourly outputs in the
hours included in the seasonal profiles are averaged to determine the expected hydro
output for that season and profile. This generation is offered in to the GSO at a price so it
is always dispatched. Hydro outputs can vary significantly from year to year based on
water inflows throughout the year. To avoid using a GSO that reflected either a wet or
dry year, the hydro outputs used are reflective of the long-term average annual hydro
production values.
Observed AESO GSO
The GSO in the first approach is based on historically observed behaviour. It is derived from
the GSO used by the AESO for loss factor calculations. To meet the requirements of this study,
the AESO’s GSO was modified as described below.
63 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix G, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
64 AESO Market and System Reporting — Current Supply and Demand,
http://ets.aeso.ca/ets_web/ip/Market/Reports/CSDReportServlet, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
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(i) Recognition of un-dispatched capacity
The GSO prepared by the AESO for loss factor calculations reflects the historical output
from generators in the province in the previous year. The historical output of each
generator is determined by averaging the generator outputs in the hours of the year that
correspond to high, medium and low load periods for each of the winter, spring, summer
and fall seasons. This results in 12 scenarios or profiles a year. The average output of a
generator in any given period is almost always less than its full installed capacity because
generator offers may not have been in-merit and/or the unit may have been unavailable
due to outages or de-rates. For this study, a block of capacity was added to each
generator to recognize the installed capacity that was present but not dispatched. The
extra blocks of capacity are added at the end of the GSO so they are only dispatched
after all historically dispatched generation has been dispatched. 
(ii) Import capacity and position in GSO
For 2008, the GSO prepared by the AESO for loss factor calculations did not include
imports. For this study, we have included the average historical import capability in the
hours of the year that correspond to high, medium and low load periods for each of the
winter, spring, summer and fall seasons. The historical import capability was obtained
from the AESO’s website.65 Import capability has been positioned in the GSO so that it
is dispatched before simple cycle gas generators that are not running under Transmission
Must Run (TMR) dispatch orders.  Import capacity is dispatched after all wind, hydro,
and first energy blocks of cogeneration, coal, and combined cycle plants. 
(iii) Available Capacity
Generators are not always fully available for dispatch because of forced, unplanned and
planned outages and occasional de-rates. As an acknowledgement of this, the maximum
output of each generator is seasonally reduced to the product of the expected availability
and the generator’s full capability. The capacities of coal-fired generators are adjusted to
reflect an annual availability of 0.9 and the capacities of gas-fired and biomass
generators are adjusted to reflect an annual availability of 0.95. Half of the unavailability
of generators is assumed to be due to planned maintenance and half of the unavailability
is assumed to be due to forced and unplanned outages and de-rates. It was assumed that
no planned maintenance is scheduled during the winter months. The seasonal availability
during the non-winter months was adjusted so the annual availability remains as
assumed. 
The assumed availability by season and generator type is shown in Table 4. However, if
historical operation of individual generators indicates higher levels of availability than
the assumed levels, the higher levels of availability were adopted.
(iv) Treatment of New Generation Additions
New wind generation is offered at a price so it is always dispatched in the GSO. The
offers from new coal generators are assumed to mirror the offers modelled for the
existing Genesee 3 generator. The offers from new gas generators are assumed to mirror
the offers of similar existing generators.
65 AESO Market and System Reporting — Interconnection Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) Values,
http://itc.aeso.ca/itc/public/atcQueryInit.do, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
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TABLE 4
Variable Cost Based GSO
The alternative GSO we use is based on the estimated variable cost of production of each
generator type. The estimated variable costs by generator type are provided by the AESO in its
Long-term Transmission System Plan (see Table 2 above).66 In this approach, all of the
available capacity from each generator is offered at the estimated variable cost of production.
The GSO is determined by dispatching the generators in order, from the lowest variable cost to
the highest variable cost. In cases where two or more generators have the same estimated
variable cost, the loss factors for 2008 were used to determine the order of dispatch. New
generators are assigned loss factors similar to those of nearby existing generators. The
modification to incorporate imports and the treatment of new additions made to the AESO
merit order also apply to the variable cost based GSO. New additions are bid in at their
estimated variable cost. We also use the annual availability factors in Table 4. For this GSO we
do not make an adjustment for observed differences between historical availability and
expected availability.
3.3.5  NORTH-SOUTH TRANSFER LIMITS
The need for north-south transmission reinforcement is predicated on transmission flows on the
north-south path above specified limits. In our models we estimated proxies for these limits by: 
(i) Modifying the publicly available system models developed by the AESO67 as part of
their transmission loss factor process to reflect the 2008 levels of system loading in each
of 12 seasonal profiles.
(ii) Specifying a cut-plane to separate the province into north and south areas.
(iii) Setting imports to zero.
(iv) Specifying the export levels at the historically recorded levels of interconnection
Available Transfer Capacity. 
66 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix E, p. 255, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
67 AESO Transmission — Loss Factors — Base Cases and Raw Data, http://www.aeso.ca/transmission/12921.html,
Accessed January 2008.
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Supplier Type Assumed Assumed Spring, Summer
Annual Winter Availability and Fall Availability
Coal Fired Generators 0.9 0.95 0.88
Simple Cycle Gas 0.95 0.975 0.94
Combined Cycle Gas 0.95 0.975 0.94
Co-generation 0.95 0.975 0.94
Biomass and Other 0.95 0.975 0.94
Wind 1 1 1.00
Hydro 1 1 1.00
Imports 1 1 1.00
(v) Modelling the generation dispatch using the previously discussed modifications to the
GSO that the AESO used in developing the transmission loss factors. 
The MW flows across the north-south cut plane were then calculated for each of the 12
seasonal loading profiles and these were taken as proxies for the north-south transfer limits in
2008. Twelve transfer limits were calculated: one for each of the four seasons and three load
profiles for each season. Table 5 shows the transfer limit proxies that were calculated for each
season and load profile. It is observed that these values are very similar to the north-south SOK
(south of Keephills — Ellerslie — Genesee) transfer limit levels shown the Edmonton-Calgary
500 kV Transmission Development Need Application.68 For those cases where no north-south
transmission reinforcement was assumed, the transfer limits were assumed to remain
unchanged over the period 2013 to 2028. Because our focus is on the addition of transmission
capacity in the Edmonton-Calgary corridor, we use the actual average limits to reflect available
capacity. Using actual transfers as a proxy for the transfer limits reflects that transfer capacity
is endogenous and depends on the state of Alberta’s electric system.
3.4 Cost Comparison 
The first part of this section provides an estimate of the cost of the two HVDC lines over the
period 2013 to 2028. The second part discusses the costs of generation re-dispatch and
alternative generation expansion if there is not transmission reinforcement. Unless otherwise
noted, our assumptions are the same as those made by the AESO.
TABLE 5
Season Loading Proxy North-South 
Transfer Limit (MW)
Winter High 1846.19
Winter Medium 1917.47
Winter Low 1681.73
Spring High 1948.39
Spring Medium 2117.02
Spring Low 1967.69
Summer High 1747.03
Summer Medium 1802.84
Summer Low 1692.18
Fall High 1745.42
Fall Medium 1714.33
Fall Low 1375.43
68 Figure 3-3 Page 21 Edmonton-Calgary 500 kV Transmission Development Need Application, May 7, 2004.
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3.4.1  COST OF NORTH-SOUTH HVDC TRANSMISSION 
The stated cost of the north-south HVDC transmission upgrade is $3.135 billion ($2008) and
the upgrade is projected to be in service in 2013.69 Assuming inflation of 5 per cent a year for
the first five years and 2 per cent thereafter,70 the nominal capital cost in 2013 is estimated to
be $4.0 billion.
New capital additions must be operated and maintained. The nominal annual operating and
maintenance costs for the new transmission upgrade are assumed to be 1.5 per cent of the
initial capital cost,71 or $60 million per year in 2013 and escalate with inflation thereafter. 
The useful life of transmission upgrades is assumed to be 34 years,72 but we are interested in
the costs over the period from 2013 to 2028. The NPV ($2008) of the annual revenue
requirements for capital and O&M costs over this period are determined by first adjusting
nominal cost for inflation and then discounting these real costs at a rate of 7 per cent. Using
this calculation, the NPV in 2008 is $2.25 billion ($2008). These calculations are detailed in
Appendix C. 
3.4.2  COST OF GENERATION RE-DISPATCH AND/OR ALTERNATE GENERATION EXPANSION CASES
The cost of generation in the unconstrained cases is compared to the constrained cases by
modelling the generation dispatch and energy production from each generator in Alberta for
each year between 2013 and 2028. The cost of production in the constrained cases is compared
to the cost of production assuming unconstrained dispatch. 
To compare the costs of unconstrained generation dispatch and constrained dispatch, each of
the suppliers in the province was assigned a generation type. The types were: wind, hydro,
simple cycle gas, combined cycle gas, co-generation, coal before 2012, coal after 2012, and
imports. Biomass and other generation were treated as co-generators. The production from
each generator each year was calculated using a generation dispatch order and a system model
of high, medium and low load scenarios for each of the winter, spring, summer and fall
periods. Generation was dispatched to meet Alberta load and not for export. 
The generation from all simple cycle gas, combined cycle gas, co-generation, coal before 2012,
coal after 2012, and imports, was summed by type and the variable costs of production were
calculated for each year. Existing generation was assumed to have variable costs equal to that
of new generation of a similar type in 2008. The cost of production of wind and hydro
generation was not calculated because these values did not differ in the compared cases studied
in this report. 
69 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Section 4.3 Edmonton to Calgary transmission system
reinforcements, p. 39, June 2009, http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed
Sept. 23, 2009.
70 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix E, p. 251, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
71 Consistent with the AESO’s assumptions in the 2004 N-S 500 kV Transmission Needs Application.
72 Consistent with the AESO’s assumptions in the 2004 N-S 500 kV Transmission Needs Application.
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Existing generation and generation currently under construction are common to all cases. Fixed
costs for these do not differ between the cases. The difference in fixed costs between the
constrained and unconstrained cases is wholly attributable to differences in the type and
amount of new generation added to meet the AESO’s expectation of an ERM of 10 per cent
either on a provincewide basis or an area basis, depending on if the north-south transmission
limits are binding. Because of this, only the fixed costs associated with the type and amount of
new generation added to meet the AESO’s criteria of an ERM of 10 per cent were calculated.
With the forecast additions of incremental wind generation, the type and amount of installed
generation capacity in both the constrained and unconstrained cases is the same. As a result, if
wind development occurs as assumed, the fixed costs of the constrained and unconstrained
cases will be the same and the increased cost of constrained generation will only be the
difference in generation re-dispatch, i.e., variable costs, which are primarily fuel and
greenhouse gas offset costs. The extent of wind generation is sufficient that load can be met
and north-south transfer limits maintained through re-dispatch of existing generation and
committed generation that is currently under construction, without installing incremental gas-
based generation in the south.73 This is not the case, however, when we assume no further
wind development in the south.
The difference in fixed and variable costs between the unconstrained generation and
constrained generation case is calculated for each year of the study, and the NPV of the
difference to 2008 is calculated using a discount factor of 7 per cent.
Two scenarios are considered. They differ based on whether we use the Observed AESO GSO
or the Variable Cost-Based GSO. 
The NPV ($2008) of the cost of generation re-dispatch and/or alternate generation expansion
cases for these two scenarios is summarized in Table 6. The costs presented in Table 6 do not
include the avoided cost of the two proposed HVDC transmission lines. 
TABLE 6
Scenario NPV of Increased Generation Costs in $2008
Observed AESO GSO $228 million
Variable cost based GSO $21 million
Forecast increases in southern load are largely met by increased wind generation independent
of the two HVDC lines. All new generation (other than new wind generation) added to meet
the AESO’s ERM expectation can be supercritical pulverized coal in the Edmonton area.
Generation re-dispatch is only infrequently required to maintain north-south flows within
current limits: 1.7 per cent of total MWhrs for the observed GSO, and 0.2 per cent of the total
MWhrs for the variable cost GSO. Assuming generation dispatch is based on the observed
AESO GSO, the NPV ($2008) of the costs of re-dispatching generation to keep north-south
flows within current limits is $228 million. If the generation dispatch is based on generator
variable costs only, the NPV ($2008) of the costs of re-dispatching generation to keep north-
south flows within current limits is $21 million.
73 Our base case identifies that the costs of congestion are only a function of re-dispatch. These costs are higher the
lower the variable cost of northern generation relative to southern generation. For this reason we assume that
additional capacity in the north is coal-fired and not co-generation. See Table 3.
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The net benefit of the two HVDC lines is shown in Table 7. The net benefit is the cost savings
from Table 6 less the costs of the two HVDC lines ($2.25 billion). The net benefit is always
negative, indicating that the generation-only solution, though not likely optimal, is better. The
net benefit is large and negative, primarily because the cost savings from being able to dispatch
northern generation instead of southern generation when transmission is unconstrained (i.e.,
avoiding generation re-dispatch (as shown in Table 6)), are relatively small. 
TABLE 7
Scenario Net Benefit of HVDC Lines in $2008
Observed AESO GSO ($2.02 billion)
Variable cost based GSO ($2.23 billion)
3.4.3  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Gas Price Sensitivity
The cost of generation re-dispatch is sensitive to the assumed price of natural gas. Lower gas
prices make gas generation more attractive, while higher gas prices make coal generation more
attractive. Lower gas prices will also lower the cost of generation re-dispatch necessary to
maintain north-south within limits. The gas price forecast used by the AESO is shown
graphically in Appendix E of the AESO’s Long-term Transmission System Plan.74 This
forecast, which the AESO indicates was obtained in 2008,75 covers the period between 2008
and 2018 and rarely drops below $8.00/gigajoule (GJ). After 2018 the gas price was assumed
to escalate at 2 per cent per year. The implied real cost of natural gas in $2008 in the AESO’s
calculations of LUEC for gas-fired generator types is approximately $7.46/GJ. 
For each of the scenarios investigated, the price of natural gas was increased until the NPV
($2008) of the generation re-dispatch was equal to the NPV in 2013 of the proposed north-
south HVDC transmission upgrade. The gas prices where the costs of re-dispatch match the
cost of the proposed north-south HVDC transmission upgrade are summarized in the Table 8.
The impact of the gas price on the difference in cost between cases is minimal.  The north-
south transfer limits can be met through minimal redispatch and without the addition of new
gas-based generators in the Calgary region. As a result, the increase in the gas price required to
make the two HVDC lines the minimal cost is very large.76
TABLE 8
Scenario Gas Price in $2008/GJ so NPV of cost of Generation Re-dispatch equals 
NPV of planned north-south HVDC transmission upgrade
Observed AESO GSO $66.80/GJ
Variable cost based GSO $790.70/GJ
74 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix E, p. 252, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
75 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix E, p. 252, June 2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/AESO_LTTSP_Final_July_2009.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
76 The $790.70 price is not a typo.
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Greenhouse Gas Offset Cost Sensitivity
The cost of generation re-dispatch is sensitive to the assumed cost of GHG offsets. Lower
GHG offset costs make coal generation more attractive, and higher GHG offset costs make gas
generation more attractive. For the two generic stacking orders GHG offset costs were reduced
to zero. The NPV ($2008) of the cost of the generation re-dispatch and alternative expansion
necessary to keep north-south flows within limits is summarized in Table 9. The costs presented
in Table 9 do not include the avoided cost of the two proposed HVDC transmission lines.
A comparison of the NPV of increased costs shown in Table 6 and Table 9 indicates that
assuming GHG cost offsets are eliminated will not significantly alter the NPV of increased
costs of generator re-dispatch to maintain north-south transfers within limits. 
TABLE 9
Scenario NPV of Generation Re-dispatch ($2008) assuming GHG 
offset costs are reduced to zero
Observed AESO GSO $245 million
Variable cost based GSO $23 million
Line Losses
The impact on transmission losses of generation re-dispatch compared to the proposed north-
south HVDC transmission reinforcement and unconstrained dispatch was not evaluated.
However, the proposed HVDC transmission upgrade will reduce but not eliminate system
losses. Generation re-dispatch to maintain north-south flow limits will tend to maintain losses
at current levels. Line losses for the entire transmission system were $236 million in 2008 and
are forecast to be $126.2 million in 2009.77 The average (expected) line losses per year over
2008 and 2009 for the AIES are approximately $180 million. If north-south reinforcement
eliminated 25 per cent of these losses, then an additional cost of not introducing the two
HVDC lines (and no other reinforcement alternative) from continued lines losses would have a
NPV of $292 million ($2008). Table 10 shows the NPV of the net benefit of the two HVDC
lines when line losses are incorporated into our results. The net benefit is the sum of generation
cost savings plus line loss reduction less the cost of the two HVDC lines. 
TABLE 10
Scenario Generation Line Loss Cost of HVDC Net Benefit of
Cost Savings Reduction Lines HVDC Lines ($2008)
relative to 
Generation only
Observed AESO GSO $228 million $292 million $2.25 billion ($1.73 billion)
Variable cost based GSO $21 million $292 million $2.25 billion ($1.94 billion)
77 AESO Transmission — Loss Factors — Calibration Factors-2009,
http://www.aeso.ca/downloads/Q3_2009_Rider_E_Estimate.pdf, Accessed Sept. 23, 2009.
40
Even if all line losses were eliminated if the two HVDC lines were added, raising the benefit of
the reduction in line losses by another $880 million, the net benefit of the two HVDC lines
would still be between ($852 million) and ($1.06 billion).
Wind
We also explore the sensitivity of our results to the assumption that wind power in southern
Alberta will develop as expected by the AESO. The assumption in the planning scenarios
(made by the AESO and us) is to de-rate wind based on its average availability. For instance,
the estimated 6,000 MW of wind expected by 2028 produces an average of 2,120 MW of
output.78 The problem is that this average will not be representative of the variation in energy
production in any given hour. To the extent that wind generation from various facilities is
positively correlated, then the average could be misleading. If the correlation is one, then
situations can arise where either all of the wind is available or none of it is available. In their
long-term plan, the AESO assume that wind is “firmed” after 2018.79 Firming means that the
average de-rated capacity will always be available even if the wind does not blow.
The alternatives for firming include investment in additional capacity equal to the de-rated
expected capacity. In the constrained case this would likely be gas-fired generation in the
south. In the unconstrained case this could be some combination of coal or gas in the north or
gas in the south. Of course there are other alternatives to achieve firming of the wind capacity,
including storage, or expanding the capabilities of the tie line with British Columbia.
Given the AESO’s assumptions regarding greenhouse gas offset costs, gas-fired generation in
the south has lower long-run unit costs and does not require investment in transmission. Hence,
gas-fired generation in the south is preferred; location signals should ensure such an outcome.
This conclusion holds even if greenhouse gas offset costs are reduced by up to 40 per cent.
On the other hand, if greenhouse gas offset costs fall by more than 40 per cent, then the long-
run unit costs of coal can be lower than gas-fired generation at sufficiently high-capacity
factors. For instance, if greenhouse gas offset costs are zero, then coal-fired generation has a
lower long-run unit cost than gas if the capacity factor is greater than 60 per cent. For
greenhouse gas offset costs less than 60 per cent of the AESO’s assumed value, it may be
possible that expanding coal generation in the north and adding transmission capacity would be
less costly to firm up wind than gas in the south. 
Using coal-fired generation to firm up wind capacity is not likely to be optimal because coal-
fired generation is typically baseloaded. It would be more natural to assume that the choice is
between gas-fired capacity in the south and gas-fired capacity in the north plus transmission.
In that case, the best choice is gas-fired generation in the south since the generation cost is the
same and an expansion of transmission capacity is not required. An alternative interpretation
that makes coal-fired generation in the north a more logical alternative, and which is consistent
with our modeling, is that wind generation is simply not developed. This is an extreme
assumption that favours the development of coal in the north and adding transmission capacity.
78 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan – Appendix G, June 2009. The AESO assumes a range of capacity
availability for wind, from 27.5 per cent to 37.5 per cent, with an average value of 32.5 per cent. Based on historical
wind dispatch, we assume instead a 35 per cent capacity availability. 
79 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Appendix G, June 2009 at p. 284: With respect to wind power,
“It was assumed that an economic energy storage technology would be available to projects built in 2018 and after.”
41
We consider whether  our conclusion regarding the economic efficiency of the proposed
HVDC lines is robust to zero greenhouse gas offset costs and no additional wind investment
after 2009, assuming variable cost based dispatch.  In the unconstrained case, we assume that
coal and gas-fired capacity is added in the north, where we limit the amount of incremental
coal generation added so that it operates at a capacity factor of 85 per cent or more.  In the
constrained case, incremental generation in the north is coal and gas, where we again limit the
amount of incremental coal generation added so that it operates at a capacity factor of 85 per cent
or more and only gas-fired generation in the south. Under these assumptions we find that the
net present value of the lower generation costs in the unconstrained case is $815 million
($2008) instead of $21 million ($2008). Though a large increase in the benefit associated with
the two HVDC lines, the net present value of the cost of the two HVDC lines is still
$1.1 billion more than the generation-only solution, and it assumes the cost of greenhouse
gas offset costs are zero. (See Table 11.)
TABLE 11
Scenario Generation Line Loss Cost of HVDC Net Benefit of HVDC
Cost Savings Reduction Lines ($2008) relative
to Generation only
Variable cost based GSO $815 million $292 million $2.25 billion ($1.14 billion)
3.4.4  OBSERVATIONS
In this part we make a number of observations regarding our methodology and the conclusions. 
Load Forecast
The AESO’s forecast load growth (in both its 2007 and 2008 forecasts) is high compared to
recent history. If load growth continues at the levels seen over the past three years, the growth
in north-south flows will be abated. In this case, the frequency and duration of periods when
generation re-dispatch is needed in the absence of transmission reinforcements to limit flows
on the north-south path will be less and the net benefit of NPV of the HVDC lines will become
even more negative.
Real Option Analysis
In our analysis, we explored the sensitivity of our results to some key assumptions. Explicitly
incorporating uncertainty about key variables into the analysis is important, but beyond our
scope here. Instead, it is worthwhile to understand that a real option analysis would indicate
that in situations of uncertainty regarding greenhouse gas offset costs, the price of gas, and
load growth, there is an additional cost associated with the two HVDC lines relative to the
combined cycle gas generation solution. The additional cost arises because choosing the two
HVDC lines is riskier. The investment required for the two HVDC lines is large and sunk.
Hence, a decision to expand transmission runs the risk of having some capacity stranded, or
underutilized for extended periods of time if load growth is smaller than expected, gas prices
remain low and greenhouse gas offset costs are high. The real option perspective is that there is
an additional cost to investing early in sunk capital assets before uncertainty is, at least 
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partially, resolved. By waiting, more information becomes available, allowing for better decision
making. The advantage of gas generation is that it is scalable and much more flexible. Gas
generation can be constructed in a shorter time period than transmission, it is possible to slow the
installation of total capacity if warranted by changes in the economic environment, and building
gas generation does not preclude making large investments in transmission in the future. 
Other Benefits of Transmission Expansion
Other benefits associated with transmission expansion have been suggested. The three most
prominent are mitigation of market power, reliability, and preservation of the single price,
energy only market.
The market power concern is that reinforcement of the north-south transmission path is
necessary to avoid the exercise of market power in southern Alberta. This is a possibility,
though it is not obvious, given the anticipated extent of wind generation and measures that will
result in its firming. Over the period of our simulations, 2013 to 2028, in the wind-as-expected
case, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (based on capacity shares) that excludes north-
south transfers never exceeds 1,348.80 An HHI of 1,348 is not likely indicative of a market
power problem.81
In any event, there are two relevant questions. First, is the cost of market power greater than
$1.7 to $1.9 billion? The benefit from disciplining market power by installing the two HVDC
lines must exceed its cost for market power considerations to justify the two HVDC lines.
However, it is not sufficient to conclude that the two HVDC lines are economic because they
control market power. The second question that needs to be asked is whether there are cheaper
alternatives to mitigate the development of market power in southern Alberta. If there are, then
the two HVDC lines remain uneconomic.
A suggested benefit of the two HVDC lines is that they are necessary to meet reliability
requirements. It is important to distinguish between the costs of congestion and the costs of
unreliability. Our analysis measures the cost of congestion. In doing so, we continue to meet
current reliability requirements. In its Long-term Transmission System Plan 2009, the AESO
projects that by 2014 reliability criteria will be violated without transmission reinforcement.82
In our simulations, the transfer limits without the two HVDC lines are based on the 2008
observed limits, so even in the constrained case, the reliability requirements continue to be met
assuming the expected wind capacity is available. We address that wind might not be available
by considering an alternative case where wind capacity is replaced by gas-fired generation in
southern Alberta. In this case, the current reliability requirements continue to be met.
80 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is an index of market power. It equals the sum of squared market shares. It
ranges from 0 (perfect competition) to 10,000 (monopoly). 
81 We admit that the application of HHI to electricity markets may be problematic. However, it shares many of the same
difficulties associated with diagnosing market power based on market share, the measure used in the Fair, Efficient
and Open Competition Regulation (Alberta Regulation 159/2009). Section 5(5) of the Fair, Efficient and Open
Competition Regulation limits the market share (based on capacity) of a market participant to 30 per cent.
82 AESO Long-term Transmission System Plan — Section 4.3 Edmonton to Calgary transmission system
reinforcements. Subsection 4.3.3 Alignment with planning objectives.
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A third objection to our analysis does not address the costs and benefits of the two HVDC lines
as such, but instead is that, moving away from the zero congestion policy and towards location
based price signals that reflect congestion costs and costs of service would jeopardize the
market design in Alberta. In particular, a leap appears to be made that the only way to
implement location-based charges is to introduce locational marginal pricing (LMP) or nodal
pricing for energy. Under LMP, a price is set at every node in the electric network and
differences in prices reflect transmission costs. However, it is not necessary to have locational
signals in the energy market. Instead it is possible to have locational signals embedded in the
price of transmission access. It may be possible, for instance, to institute locational access
prices for transmission without requiring extensive changes in the market design.83
There may be other benefits that we have not considered that justify the two HVDC lines.
However, to overturn our conclusion that the two HVDC lines are inefficient, it is necessary to
establish that any such advantages outweigh the $1.7 billion to $1.9 billion of additional cost
from the transmission line construction. It must also be proven that any other benefits cannot
be achieved by a less expensive alternative.
83 On the Nova gas pipeline system in Alberta receipt charges are differentiated by location and cost.
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4.0 USING INDEPENDENT REGULATORS: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
DELEGATION
Bill 50 raises an interesting question involving the regulatory approval process for electrical
transmission lines: does it warrant suspension of the needs assessment? There are a number of
advantages associated with using an independent regulator to assess whether a transmission
project is in the public interest. These advantages include the following:
(a) It is easier for an independent regulator to commit to regulatory policy, therefore reducing 
political and regulatory risk and encouraging investment.
(b) It is less likely that project approval and conditions will be driven by short-term political 
interests, and more likely that a focus on long-run benefits and costs can be maintained.
(c) Regulatory agencies typically have relevant expertise, historic awareness and background
knowledge to understand, evaluate and adjudicate complex issues. 
(d) Regulatory processes are designed to subject interested parties’ positions to public scrutiny
and evaluation. They provide a forum for a public debate and record that reduces the issues
and problems caused by asymmetric information and strategic behaviour.
(e) Regulatory processes guard against private interests having an undue influence.
(f) Public regulatory processes make explicit the alternatives available and require the
regulator, through written decisions, to explain their rationale. This is an important
constraint on any potential collusion between the decision maker and private interests.
(g) Regulatory processes allow for public participation and monitoring, contributing to
accountability, understanding and legitimacy.
The disadvantages of a regulatory process with regard to approval of a transmission project are
the costs of approvals may be higher, and that decisions may not be timely. Unilateral action by
a government is likely to be superior only if there is widespread agreement that a problem
exists, time is of the essence, and the cost of not addressing the problem dwarfs the cost of not
exploring alternatives. These conditions imply that some response is more important than
determining which response, if any, is optimal. It is important to distinguish between the
general concept of critical infrastructure, and the four projects identified as critical in Bill 50. It
is not clear that the critical infrastructure identified in Bill 50 meets all of these requirements.
In general, it is not expected that a transmission project would meet these conditions. 
Our results show that the two proposed HVDC lines are economically inefficient and
unwarranted given the AESO’s assumptions and forecasts, while maintaining the same supply
adequacy and reliability requirements. Such findings are indicative of the benefit of a
regulatory process and raise doubts that there is an emergency. 
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Any benefits of the regulatory process depend on how well it functions. The two-stage needs
identification process leaves a lot to be desired, as suggested by the difficulties with
landowners that resulted in the 2005 approval of the needs application for two 500 kV AC
transmission lines between Edmonton and Calgary being voided in 2007.84 Difficulties
associated with the legislative framework and/or irregular conduct by the regulator in the past
should not be deemed evidence that regulation does not work, nor does it justify an emergency
response. If the existing regulatory process is found to be dysfunctional (and there appears to
be frustration on the part of generators at the pace of transmission expansion), the answer is
likely that it is better to institute regulatory reform than abandon regulation. The uproar over
Bill 50 and the two HVDC lines shows the value of a regulatory process. The debate over
transmission investment and additions should not be in the media and between duelling
websites. Albertans deserve better.
84 The decision was voided in 2007 after it was learned the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board had hired private
investigators to observe landowners who had intervened in the regulatory process. In response, the Province split the
Board into two regulatory bodies as of Jan. 1, 2008: the Alberta Utilities Commission and the Energy Resources
Conservation Board. The utilities commission oversees distribution and sale of electricity and natural gas to
consumers, as well as handling applications for new or upgraded transmission lines. The conservation board focuses
on development of Alberta’s oil and gas reserves.
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APPENDIX A: FORECAST AIES LOAD: ANNUAL ENERGY AND PEAK DEMAND
Forecast AIES Load (Based On AESO FC 2007)
47
Year Energy (GWh) Growth Peak Demand (MW) Growth
2009 60422 — 9148 —
2010 62062 2.7% 9456 3.4%
2011 63951 3.0% 9750 3.1%
2012 66379 3.8% 10064 3.2%
2013 68790 3.6% 10425 3.6%
2014 70854 3.0% 10719 2.8%
2015 73094 3.2% 11005 2.7%
2016 75550 3.4% 11328 2.9%
2017 77582 2.7% 11647 2.8%
2018 79328 2.3% 11909 2.2%
2019 81248 2.4% 12188 2.3%
2020 83957 3.3% 12560 3.1%
2021 86496 3.0% 13000 3.5%
2022 89068 3.0% 13422 3.2%
2023 91700 3.0% 13856 3.2%
2024 94405 2.9% 14250 2.8%
2025 97226 3.0% 14758 3.6%
2026 100065 2.9% 15223 3.2%
2027 103014 2.9% 15703 3.2% 
2028 106049 2.9% 16198 3.2%
APPENDIX B: FORECAST GENERATION ADDITIONS AND RETIREMENTS 
Generation Additions — With Wind Power Additions
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Year North North North South South
Coal Simple Cycle Co-Generation Wind Simple Cycle
(MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) Gas (MW)
2009 0 101 188 280 0
2010 0 101 0 230 120
2011 450 0 0 280 0
2012 86 0 0 280 0
2013 514 0 0 280 0
2014 624 0 0 280 0
2015 536 0 0 280 0
2016 497 0 0 280 0
2017 490 0 0 280 0
2018 373 0 0 280 0
2019 349 0 0 280 0
2020 446 0 0 280 0
2021 444 0 0 280 0
2022 398 0 0 280 0
2023 431 0 0 280 0
2024 415 0 0 280 0
2025 440 0 0 280 0
2026 477 0 0 280 0
2027 492 0 0 280 0
2028 474 0 0 280 0
Generation Additions — No Additional Wind Power and without N-S Trans Reinforcement 
49
Year North North North North South South South
Coal Combined Cycle Co-Generation Simple Wind Simple Cycle Combined
(MW) (MW) (MW) Cycle Gas (MW) (MW) Gas (MW) Cycle (MW)
2009 0 0 188 101 66 0 795
2010 0 0 0 101 0 120 45
2011 450 0 0 0 0 0 313
2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 233
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 278
2014 0 251 0 0 0 0 242
2015 86 241 0 0 0 0 226
2016 153 170 0 0 0 0 223
2017 117 136 0 0 0 0 175
2018 105 134 0 0 0 0 165
2019 121 176 0 0 0 0 205
2020 144 151 0 0 0 0 204
2021 236 33 0 0 0 0 186
2022 288 0 0 0 0 0 199
2023 278 0 0 0 0 0 192
2024 293 0 0 0 0 0 203
2025 315 0 0 0 0 0 218
2026 324 0 0 0 0 0 224
2027 313 0 0 0 0 0 216
2028 318 0 0 0 0 0 220
Generation Additions — No Additional Wind Power and with N-S Trans Reinforcement 
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Year North North North North South South 
Coal Combined Cycle Co-Generation Simple Wind Simple Cycle
(MW) (MW) (MW) Cycle Gas (MW) (MW) Gas (MW)
2009 0 0 188 101 66 0
2010 0 0 0 101 0 120
2011 931 283 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 227 574 0 0 0 0
2014 251 341 0 0 0 0
2015 239 314 0 0 0 0
2016 243 304 0 0 0 0
2017 188 241 0 0 0 0
2018 166 239 0 0 0 0
2019 188 314 0 0 0 0
2020 245 255 0 0 0 0
2021 454 0 0 0 0 0
2022 487 0 0 0 0 0
2023 471 0 0 0 0 0
2024 282 214 0 0 0 0
2025 264 269 0 0 0 0
2026 272 276 0 0 0 0
2027 276 254 0 0 0 0
2028 282 256 0 0 0 0
Generator Additions to 2008 Case (Under Construction or Recently Completed)
Generator/Year Available 2009 2010 2011 North or South
Blue Trail Wind 66 MW — — South
Cloverbar 2 Gas Fired 101 MW — — North
CNRL Horizon Cogeneration 103 MW — — North
MEG Energy Cogeneration 85 MW — — North
Cloverbar 3 Gas Fired — 101 MW — North
Crossfield Gas Fired — 120 MW — South
Keephills 3 Coal Fired — — 450 MW North
Note: All Generation Additions are modeled as available beginning in the first quarter following the
expected commissioning date
Generation Retirements
Generator/Year Available 2009 2010 North or South
Rossdale 8,9,10 Gas Fired 209 MW — North
Medicine Hat Gas Generation 37 MW — South
Wabamun 4 Coal Fired Generation — 279 MW North
Note: All Generation Retirements are modeled as out of service beginning in the first quarter following
the expected retirement date
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APPENDIX C: NPV ($2008) OF PROPOSED N-S HVDC TRANSMISSION ADDITION
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